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How to Conduct Email Phishing Experiments 
Abstract: 
Phishing attacks are on the rise and more sophisticated than ever before inflicting major 
financial damage on businesses. Simulated phishing attacks are of growing interest in aca-
demia, however, the studies are mainly focusing on the specific angles of the phenomenon, 
e.g. ethical considerations; and not on the implementation itself. Author was not able to find 
consolidated guidelines that would walk through the whole process of conducting email 
phishing experiments. The aim of this study is to explore how to conduct simulated phishing 
experiments and to create consolidated guidelines that companies could easily implement 
on the example of Company X1. The research questions postulated for this study are: What 
should companies consider when conducting phishing experiments? What is the correlation 
between the phishing email difficulty level and the click through rate? How people react to 
simulated email phishing experiments? Both quantitative and qualitative research methods 
were applied to find answers to the research questions. Firstly, based on the existing studies, 
guidelines on how to conduct phishing experiments in companies were created. Secondly, 
phishing experiment (Experiment I) was designed and conducted among 53 participants ap-
plying a crossover research design. The employees were randomly divided into two groups 
(Group K) and (Group L); and they were sent in two distinct time periods two emails which 
corresponded to the different difficulty levels (Type X and Type Y). During the first cam-
paign Group K was sent Type X email and Group L was sent Type Y email and during the 
second campaign it was vice versa. Type X email messages were designed to be targeted, 
grammatically correct and with relevant content. Type Y email messages were designed to 
be general and with visible grammar mistakes. Additionally, a spear phishing experiment 
(Experiment II) was conducted among two participants applying a single-subject quasi-ex-
perimental research design. The third type of emails (Type Z) that were sent out during the 
spear phishing experiment were personalized and relevant based on the pre-conducted re-
search about the two targets. Thirdly, qualitative interviews were designed and conducted 
with the employees who participated in the simulated phishing experiments to investigate 
how they react to such experiments and to improve the guidelines based on their feedback. 
This research confirmed that the proposed guidelines are sufficient for conducting phishing 
experiments in a company setting. The results of this research show that 23% of the em-
ployees clicked on the link embedded to the more complex (Type X) phishing email and 
11% of the employees clicked on the link embedded to the simpler (Type Y) email. Further-
more, Type Y emails were reported as phishing emails more frequently (22,6%), whereas 
Type X, emails were reported less (18,9%). The spear phishing experiment was successful, 
and the participants did not recognize the deceptiveness of the simulated phishing emails. 
This research shows that the phishing success rate is higher when the content is targeted and 
relevant. The employee awareness level about reporting phishing was low and the main 
stimuli for clicking on phishing links was curiosity. The findings of this study imply that 
people react positively to phishing experiments if these are conducted in a manner that it 
does not pose psychological damage or distress for the participants. 
Keywords: 
Phishing, experiments, social engineering, feedback method, security behaviour, security 
awareness. 
CERCS: P170, Computer science, numerical analysis, systems, control 
                                                 
1 Author impersonated real company name by encoding „Company X“ 
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Kuidas viia läbi õngitsuskirja eksperimenti 
Lühikokkuvõte: 
Õngitsusrünnete hulk on aasta-aastalt kasvanud ja ründed on muutunud keerumkamaks kui 
kunagi varem, põhjustades ettevõtetele rahalist kahju. Akadeemilistes ringkondades on kas-
vanud huvi simuleeritud õngitsusrünnete vastu, kuid uuringud keskenduvad peamiselt spet-
siifilistele aspektidele, nagu näiteks eetilised kaalutlused, ja mitte õngitsuseksperimendi lä-
biviimisele. Autor ei leidnud olemasolevate teadustööde hulgast konsolideeritud juhised, 
mis kirjeldaksid, kuidas viia läbi õngituskirjade eksperimenti. Käesoleva lõputöö eesmär-
giks on uurida, kuidas viia läbi simuleeritud õngituskirjade eksperimenti ja luua konsolidee-
ritud juhiseid, mida ettevõtted saaksid lihtsalt rakendada ettevõtte X2 näitel. Lõputöö uuri-
misküsimused on järgnevad: Mida peaksid ettevõtted arvestama õngitsuseksperimendi läbi-
viimsel? Mis seos on õngitsuskirja raskusastme ja klikkimise sageduse vahel? Kuidas ini-
mesed reageerivad simuleeritud õngitsuseksperimentidele? Antud uurimistöös kasutati nii 
kvantitatiivseid kui ka kvalitatiivseid meetodeid. Esiteks sai loodud konsolideeritud juhised 
simuleeritud õngitsuseksperimentide läbiviimiseks, mis baseeruvad eelevatel uurimustöö-
del. Teiseks viidi läbi õngitsuseksperiment (Eksperiment I) 53 osaleja hulgas, kasutades ris-
tuva uuringu disaini. Töötajad jaotati juhuslikult kaheks grupiks: (Grupp K) ja (Grupp L). 
Neile saadeti erinevatel kuupäevadel kaks e-kirja erinevate raskusastemega: (Tüüp X) ja 
(Tüüp Y). Esimeses kampaanias saadeti Grupile K keerulisem kiri (Tüüp X) ja Grupile L 
lihtsam kiri (Tüüpi Y) ja teise kampaania ajal oli see vastupidi. Raskemad (Tüüp X) e-kirjad 
olid sihitud, grammatiliselt korrektsed ja relevantse sisuga. Kergemad e-kirjad (Tüüp Y) 
olid üldisemad ja nähtavate grammatikavigadega. Suunatud õngitsuseksperiment (Ekspe-
riment II) viidi läbi kahe osaleja hulgas, kasutades üksikosaleja kvaasi-eksperimentaalset 
uurimustöö disaini. Tüüp Z e-kirjad, mis saadeti välja suunatud õngitsuseksperimendi ajal, 
olid personaalsed ja relevantse sisuga ning baseerusid kahe osaleja taustauuringutel. Kol-
mandaks kavandati ja viidi läbi kvalitatiivsed intervjuud osalejatega, kes osalesid simulee-
ritud õngitsusrünnetes, et uurida, kuidas nad sellistele eksperimentidele reageerivad ja pa-
randada lähtuvalt nende tagasisidest õngituskirjade eksperimendi juhiseid. Antud uurimis-
töö kinnitas, et väljatöötatud juhised on piisavad, et viia läbi õngituskirjade eksperimenti 
ettevõttetes. Uurimistöö tulemused näitasid, et 23% töötajatest klikkisid raskemini äratun-
tavale e-kirjale (Tüüp X) ja 11% lihtsamini ära tuntavale e-kirjale (Tüüp Y). Lisaks rapor-
teeriti lihtsamini ära tuntavat kirja sagedamini (22,6%) kui raskemini ära tuntavat kirja 
(18.9%). Suunatud õngitsuseksperiment osutus edukas ja osalejad ei saanud aru simuleeri-
tud pettusest. Käesolev lõputöö näitab, et õngitsusrünnede edukus on suurem, kui e-kirja 
sisu on sihitud ja relevantne. Töötajate raporteerimise teadlikkuse tase oli madal ja üks pea-
misi klikkimise põhjused oli uudishimu. Selle uuringu tulemused viitavad sellele, et inime-
sed reageerivad simuleeritud õngitsusrünnetele positiivselt, kui need viiakse läbi viisil, mis 
ei tekita osalejatele psühholoogilist kahju või stressi.  
Võtmesõnad: 
Õngitsuskiri, eksperiment, tehnosotsiaalne sahkerdamine, tagasiside, turvakäitimine, turva-
teadlikus 
CERCS: P170, Arvutiteadus, arvutusmeetodid, süsteemid, juhtimine (automaatjuhtimis-
teooria) 
  
                                                 
2 Autor asendas päris ettevõtte nime Ettevõtte X-ga  
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List of Acronyms and Definitions 
 
AOL  American Online 
APWG Anti-Phishing Working Group 
UK  United Kingdom 
PC  Personal Computer 
CEO  Chief Executive Officer 
US  United States 
FBI  Federal Bureau of Investigation 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
CIO  Chief Information Officer 
URL  Uniform Resource Locator 
SaaS  Software as a Service 
IT  Information Technology 
SET  Social Engineering Toolkit 
SCORM Sharable Content Object Reference Model 
LMS  Learning Management System 
Bcc  Blind Carbon Copy 
DNS  Domain Name System 
SMTP  Simple Mail Transfer Protocol 
CERT  Computer Emergency Response Team 
CTO  Chief Technology Officer 
IP  Internet Protocol 
SSL  Secure Sockets Layer 
FQDN  Fully Qualified Domain Name 
MX  Mail Exchanger Record 
SPF  Sender Policy Framework 
GUI  Graphical User Interface 
HTML  Hypertext Markup Language 
UID  Unique Identifier 
CTR  Click Through Rate 
GDPR  General Data Protection Regulation 
PII  Personally Identifiable Information 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 General Background and Motivation 
Phishing as such is not a new concept, Symantec notes that the first instances of phishing 
attack they witnessed occurred in the 1990s and was targeted to America Online (AOL) [1]. 
The main damage associated with phishing is the cost that companies or individuals pay to 
deal with the phishing attacks. The average cost of phishing attacks is very high, and it has 
increased tremendously over the past decade. For example according to the Ponemon Insti-
tute [2], a US business with ten thousand employees spends an average around $3.77 million 
in one year to handle phishing attacks. Independent research company Vanson Bourne con-
cluded from their study conducted in 2015 that 84% of organizations had experienced a 
spear-phishing attack, which successfully penetrated their organization. They outline that 
an average financial impact of a successful spear-phishing attack is around $1.6 million and 
the victims experienced a drop of 15% in their stock prices. [3] 
APWG (Anti-Phishing Working Group) report concluded that in 2016 there were around 
10% more phishing attacks comparing to the year before [4]. Similarly, IMB X-force report 
outlines that more than half of emails that people receive are spam and the number of emails 
containing malicious attachments has increased drastically over the past years [5]. This very 
well exemplifies that phishing is of growing concern and it cannot be overlooked by com-
panies.  
The effectiveness of technical security has increased over time and attacking computer sys-
tems using technical attack vectors is not that easy anymore and as a result, attackers have 
started to incorporate social means to their attack vectors [6]. The latter attacks are also 
known as social engineering attacks. Social engineering attacks use messages from pur-
ported legitimate sources to trick people into disclosing sensitive information [7]. As ex-
plained by Ericsson [8], social engineering aims to deceive a victim and make the victim to 
perform an action, which is beneficial for the attacker. For example, the attacker wishes that 
the victim clicks on a malicious link or opens an attachment; which, in return, enables the 
attacker to install malware to the victim’s computer or get access to passwords. The Oxford 
English Dictionary [9] defines phishing as: “The fraudulent practice of sending emails pur-
porting to be from reputable companies in order to induce individuals to reveal personal 
information, such as passwords and credit card numbers.” 
1.2 Problem Statement and Contribution of author 
It is author’s experience of helping to conduct phishing experiments that has driven interest 
towards this research topic. The existing literature and reports on email phishing experi-
ments highlight the importance of testing and measuring cyber security awareness and many 
studies have been conducted regarding that. Less attention is given to the framework and 
guidelines of the email phishing experiment itself, in particularly, how to conduct email 
phishing experiments.  
The information about email phishing experiments is scattered between the research papers 
and author has not been able to find consolidated guidelines that would walk through the 
whole process of conducting email phishing experiments in a simple easy-to-implement 
way. During the past decade, however, many companies have started to run simulated phish-
ing campaigns in their organizations to investigate how security-savvy their employees are, 
but there are no standardised instructions. The aim of this study, therefore, is to develop 
consolidated easy-to-implement guidelines for companies on how to conduct phishing ex-
periments and to describe in-depth the process, including legal, technical and ethical aspects 
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that organizations should consider. These guidelines are then tested in a company setting. 
The selected company wished to remain anonymous and is, therefore, referred to as Com-
pany X.   
This research seeks to address the following research questions:  
• What should companies consider when conducting phishing experiments?  
• What is the correlation between the phishing email difficulty level and the click through 
rate?  
• How people react to simulated email phishing experiments? 
To answer the research questions, this thesis aims to do the following:  
• Describe different types of phishing, the factors of success and the purpose of phishing. 
• Discuss and display all the necessary details pertaining to legal, ethical, psychological 
and technical considerations prior conducting phishing experiments. 
• Create consolidated guidelines for companies on how to conduct phishing experiments. 
• Test the created guidelines by conducting a phishing experiment (Experiment I) in Com-
pany X implementing a crossover experimental research design. In addition, conduct 
one spear phishing experiment (Experiment II) implementing a single-subject quasi-ex-
perimental research design.  
• Measure what is a correlation between the phishing email difficulty level and the click 
through rate. 
• Conduct qualitative interviews to explore how employees react to phishing experiments 
and how to improve the guidelines. 
• Give recommendations to Company X on how to improve the process of conducting 
phishing experiments. 
1.3 Outline of the Thesis 
The aim of this thesis is to create and test guidelines for conducting phishing experiments. 
This thesis is composed of seven chapters, which are organized as follows.  
• Chapter 1. Introduction – general overview and introduction to the theses. 
• Chapter 2. Related Work - outlines the previous research that has addressed phishing 
experiments and defines the concept of phishing.  
• Chapter 3. Creating Phishing Experiment Guidelines – outlines the process of con-
ducting phishing experiments.   
• Chapter 4. Methodology - describes the underlying methodology and research de-
sign process. 
• Chapter 5. Implementation of an Email Phishing Experiment – describes the imple-
mentation of the phishing experiment and the results.  
• Chapter 6. Implementation of an Email Spear Phishing Experiment – describers the 
implementation of the spear phishing experiment and the results.  
• Chapter 7. Discussion and Conclusion – provides proposals for improvement, ideas 
for future research and discussions on main results, limitations. 
1.4 Acknowledgments 
I would like to thank the Company that agreed to participate in this research, in particularly, 
the CIO and the IT Helpdesk, who helped to conduct the phishing experiments. Addition-
ally, Tallinn Technology University for allowing to use its infrastructure and my supervisors 
for their advice and recommendations.  
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2 Related Work 
This chapter analyses the existing literature on phishing; what has been researched before 
and what have been the main results. Furthermore, the concept of phishing is scrutinized, 
and the key factors of successful phishing outlined.  
2.1 Existing Similar Studies Review 
Different studies have been conducted regarding phishing. In this chapter some of the rele-
vant similar studies in related field of research are summarized, including the purpose of 
these studies and main conclusions. 
Jakobsson and Myers [10] were one of the first ones to comprehensively study phishing and 
they built a framework for studying the attack and its countermeasures. Their study focuses 
on describing how phishing works and what should be the defence mechanisms, but it is not 
deep diving into the process of phishing nor providing guidelines for conducting phishing 
experiments.  
In order to understand what is phishing and how it is used C. Hadnagy and M. Fincher [11] 
in their book describe phishing and spear phishing, underline the psychological reasons (rec-
iprocity, obligation, concession, scarcity, authority, consistency & commitment, liking and 
social proof) why phishing works. They establish a framework of categorisation based on 
the email difficulty levels (level 1-4). Wright and Marett [12] focus on experiential and dis-
positional factors that increase the likelihood of detecting phishing. They found that experi-
ential factors (e.g., computer self-efficacy, web experience and security knowledge) signif-
icantly influenced the success of deception. Both studies highlight the importance of email 
difficulty levels and provide insights how to develop phishing email content based on the 
experiment participants’ security awareness. 
Finn and Jakobsson [13] describe ethical aspects of phishing and concluded that when ethi-
cal aspects are not considered as important or even neglected, phishing simulation partici-
pants may get a sense of victimization or irritation. Several other studies exist, which have 
found ways how to solve the ethical issues and measure users who are vulnerable for phish-
ing attacks without causing them any distress [14][15]. Likewise, El-Din [16] focuses on 
describing ethics committees’ researchers’ and professional bodies’ perspective on ethical 
views about deceptive phishing research. She outlines that the use of deception in phishing 
research can be safe if done correctly. Both studies are focusing on one angle of phishing 
experiments, i.e. ethical principles and outlining important aspects of conducting ethical 
research, and not deep diving into the process of conducting phishing campaigns. 
Deanna D. Caputo [17] and his colleagues highlight the need to collect qualitative feedback 
from the participants after the spear phishing experiment, e.g. conduct interviews with the 
participants to gain a better understanding of how people behave in phishing experiments. 
In addition, their results indicate that experiment reports and tailored framing do not neces-
sarily suffice to reduce click rates of simulated phishing experiments and, therefore, have 
little impact on participants’ future behaviour.  
Two studies bring out key points on how to avoid legal issues when conducting phishing 
experiments[11][18]. The main legal risks that the researchers are exposed to are violations 
of a provider’s terms of use, intellectual property rights and copyright infringement. It is 
crucial to understand legal aspects not to intentionally violate laws. 
Kumaraguru [19] and his colleagues highlight that phishing assessment and training effects 
might be lost somewhere between 28 days and conclude that regular simulated phishing 
assessments are needed to educate participants. Sheng and his colleagues [20] developed 
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PhishGuru, which is an anti-phishing training solution enabling organizations to train their 
employees. Participants are periodically sent out training emails in the form of simulated 
phishing emails and when employee falls for the simulated phishing attack, PhishGuru pro-
vides a short training to avoid falling for attacks in the future. Similarly, to Kumaraguru and 
his colleagues, PhishGuru studies emphasise that practise of sending security notices is not 
sufficient and follow up trainings with participants should be conducted to teach people how 
to avoid phishing attacks.  
In his research, Kaspar Prei [21] concluded that phishing assessment is an efficient way to 
measure personnel cyber security awareness level. The strength of his work is that he de-
scribes well how to conduct email phishing experiments; however, he does not investigate 
spear phishing emails and does not develop easy-to-implement guidelines that companies 
could use to conduct phishing experiments. 
Table 1. summarizes the objectives and findings of the above mentioned and other selected 
studies in the related field of research. The table exemplifies that the focus of the studies has 
been mainly on behavioural and ethical aspects of phishing, outlining the main reasons why 
phishing works and how to prevent it, what are the vectors of success and consequences of 
phishing attacks.  
Table 1. Summary of Phishing Studies 
Study Objective Relevant findings 
Designing and Con-
ducting Phishing 
Experiments [13] 
To describe what are the 
procedural aspects to con-
sider, while conducting 
phishing experiments. 
Outlining ethical and technical details 
associated with conducting phishing 
experiments is important as it enables 
the development and testing of hypoth-
eses and countermeasures.  
Ethics and Phishing 
Experiments [22] 
To examine the ethical 
questions related to 
phishing experiments in 
the real-world settings 
and to explore if the ex-
periments can be con-
ducted ethically if there is 
an opt-out option for par-
ticipants and they are de-
briefed afterwards. 
Phishing experiments include decep-
tion and contravene informed consent 
requirements; however, these can be 
conducted ethically if risks are mini-
mized and the confidentiality and the 
privacy of participants is protected. 
Legal Risks For 
Phishing Research-
ers [18] 
To describe the legal risks 
that researchers may be 
exposed to. 
The main risks are violations of a pro-
vider’s terms of use, intellectual prop-
erty rights and copyright infringement. 
Measuring Person-
nel Cyber Security 
Awareness Level 
Through Phishing 
Assessment [21] 
To suggest an efficient 
way to measure personnel 
cyber security awareness 
level.  
An efficient to measure personnel 
cyber security awareness level was 
found to be phishing assessment. 
12 
 
Study Objective Relevant findings 
Teaching Johnny 
Not to Fall for 
Phish [20] 
To determine whether 
simulated phishing emails 
help individuals to detect 
real phishing attacks.  
 
Authors developed a methodology 
called PhishGuru, which was approved 
to be effective in educating individuals 
about phishing attacks.  
Phishing Dark Wa-
ters [11] 
 
To describe phishing and 
why it works and how to 
better defend against it.  
 
The success of social engineering is 
based on the conscious guiding of tar-
get’s choices in other words influenc-
ing them. Authors developed a „Prin-
ciples of Influence” framework to bet-
ter describe it. There is no one-stop so-
lution to defend against phishing at-
tacks, but with good planning compa-
nies can take steps to mitigate the risks.  
Using Phishing Ex-
periments and Sce-
nario-Based Sur-
veys to Understand 
Security Behav-
iours in Practice [8] 
To investigate if there is a 
correlation between add-
ing personal information 
about the target to an at-
tack and the successful-
ness of the attack.  
The research results indicate that if in-
formation about the target is included 
into the attack, it is more likely that the 
attack will be successful.  
 
Baiting the hook: 
factors impacting 
susceptibility to 
phishing attacks 
[23] 
To outline the main fac-
tors that influence suscep-
tibility to phishing at-
tacks. 
Firstly, in terms of demographic char-
acteristics of individuals and their abil-
ity to detect a phishing attack, gender 
and the years of PC usage have a sta-
tistically significant impact. Secondly, 
in terms of time-related factors, pop-
up-based attacks have a higher success 
rate. Thirdly, psychological anchoring 
effect has an impact as well.  
To Deceive or Not 
to Deceive! Ethical 
Questions in Phish-
ing Research [16] 
The study discusses the 
need for deception, the 
possible consequences of 
deceptive activities and 
describes legal re-
strictions of conducting 
phishing studies in the 
context of the UK.   
The outcome of the study is a roadmap 
for researchers to consider ethical and 
legal aspects prior conducting a re-
search.  
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2.2 Defining Phishing 
This paragraph gives an overview of different types of phishing, firstly, based on the tech-
nique and, secondly, based on the attack type. Further on, it is described what is the main 
difference between the techniques and how to recognize these in practise.  
2.2.1 Definition of Phishing  
Phishing can be explained as an activity, which involves sending emails from seemingly 
reputable sources with the purpose to obtain personal information or influence email receiv-
ers. This practise combines both social engineering and technical skills. It varies in its form, 
for example it could be an attachment within the email that loads malicious software into 
the computer or it could be a link to an illicit website. The website can trick the receiver into 
downloading malware or to disclose personal information. [16][11] Different types of phish-
ing techniques can be identified. In the following spear phishing, whaling and clone phish-
ing are further described.  
Spear Phishing 
Spear phishing is a targeted form of phishing. This means that attackers take some time to 
study the target and gather information about them to create personal and relevant messages. 
Therefore, it is very difficult to discover and protect against spear phishing [11]. 
Whaling  
Whaling is the more advanced form of phishing and is targeted to executive level employ-
ees. The content is crafted to target an upper manager such as a CEO or some supervisor 
who has access to critical data and accounts. For example, the whaling email or website may 
come in the form of a false order, a legal complaint or a fake message from authorities. [24] 
Clone Phishing 
Clone phishing is a type of phishing attack by which the target is sent a cloned email repli-
cating a legitimate and previously delivered email. The email address is spoofed to appear 
as authentic and attachment or a link from a legitimate email is replaced with a malicious 
version. For example, quite often the new email is said to be an updated version of the 
original email. This technique may also be used to gain access to another machine by ex-
ploiting the social trust referring to the connection between the parties receiving the original 
email. [25] 
Furthermore, phishing emails can be divided based on the phishing attack type. In the fol-
lowing different forms of phishing pertaining to credential stealing, action-based emails and 
exploitative emails are described.  
Credential stealing 
The most usual form of phishing involves the sending of a deceptive email to a target, which 
at some point redirects the target to a malicious website, which looks legitimate. Since the 
website looks legitimate, victims are willing to enter their credentials (e.g., usernames and 
passwords), and depending on a person maybe even financial information. [23] 
Action 
Action-based phishing emails are widely targeted to businesses. Business email compromise 
scam is primarily a social engineering attack in which attackers send an email pretending to 
be a company official and it is normally sent to an emplyee responsible for comapny funds 
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urging the employee to wire money or leak other critical data. The email may be sent from 
a domain similar to that of the company’s domain, or from an actual account which has been 
taken over. The US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) highlighted that the loss of such 
attacks is estimated to be more than 3.1 billion us as of June 2016. [5] 
Exploit 
Opening attached malware or clicking on a malicious link can infect computer. Attached 
malware can be, for example, a malicious PowerShell script or an Excel file with malicious 
macros. PowerShell and macros are default features of Windows and Microsoft Office, 
which can provide remote access and malware downloads without the use of malicious tools 
or vulnerabilities [26]. A malicious link could leverage browser exploits to install malware 
or spyware on the victim’s system. Such exploits are used by attackers to compromise net-
work security. [27] 
 
2.2.2 Why Phishing Works 
Phishing attacks have evolved over time and while most of the earliest phishing emails were 
easily recognizable containing obvious mistakes and bad grammar, phishers have become 
more sophisticated and imitate enquiries from trusted sources [28]. To mitigate the risks of 
phishing and protect businesses, organizations and individuals against phishing attacks, it is 
important to understand the factors that affect susceptibility to phishing schemes, which 
helps to develop effective countermeasures [29]. 
The success of social engineering is based on the conscious guiding of target’s choices in 
other words influencing them. To better describe why phishing works, author of this thesis 
uses the „Principles of Influence” framework being described by C. Hadnagy and M. 
Fincher that consists of eight principles reciprocity, obligation, concession, scarcity, au-
thority, consistency & commitment, liking and social proof. See Figure 1. It is important to 
emphasise that these principles most often work together in different interactions 
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Figure 1. Principles of Influence [11] 
The principle of reciprocity is based on a belief that people should return gifts (something 
that the receiver values). For example, if the target is offered a refund they feel that in return 
they must give something back (personal information). [11][30] 
The principle of obligation creates influence through customs and manners by appealing to 
something about their identity. For example, fraudsters pretend to be grandkids in trouble 
and create a sense of obligation to help. [11]  
The principle of concession is when a person yields. For example, fraudsters imply that 
power has been granted to the target. The reason why it works is that concession places the 
target in a difficult situation. The principle of consistency and commitment goes hand in 
hand with the principle of concession. After a person has complied with a request, they are 
likely to continue to do so. [11][30] 
The principle of scarcity is created upon the lack of resources or making something to look 
very valuable and difficult to get. The principle of authority on the other hand is created 
upon a tendency of people to obey authorities and that people comply with orders coming 
from authorities or in an authoritative manner, for example, emails seemingly coming from 
a tax inspectorate. [11][31][30] 
The principle of liking works by creating genuine similarities with the target and being ami-
able and easy to relate to. The principle of social proof is an extremely valuable principle of 
influence by emphasising on social nature by giving illusions that everyone is contributing 
by sending money. [11][30] 
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3 Creating Phishing Experiments Guidelines  
The purpose of this chapter is to outline what companies must consider when conducting 
phishing experiments. This chapter describes all the steps of a phishing experiment; includ-
ing ethical and legal considerations, choosing a platform, developing content, informing 
employees, launching the campaign and analysing results. The content for this chapter was 
developed over the course of the year 2017. The guidelines have been implemented and 
tested in Company X.  
3.1 Before Launching Email Phishing Campaign  
3.1.1 Purpose of Phishing Campaigns 
The first question to start with is “Why?” Although the question is straightforward, how the 
company answers, can really shape and change the face of a phishing program. In this chap-
ter four different reasons that author find relevant for a company to begin with are outlined.  
The first reason is related to a security awareness with an aim to measure and increase the 
awareness within the company. Kaspar Prei [21] found that an efficient way to measure 
personnel cyber security awareness level is to conduct a phishing assessment. It was con-
cluded in “Teaching Johnny Not to Fall for Phish“ [20] research that using simulated phish-
ing assessments is an effective tool to educate individuals about phishing attacks. 
The second reason is related to experiencing a phishing attack within the company after 
which a company prioritizes awareness trainings and assessments. Phishing attacks against 
companies have increased tremendously in the past years [26][5]. Additionally, successful 
phishing attacks can make companies to lose a lot of money [32][2]. Therefore, it is of 
growing concern and reason among companies to conduct simulated phishing campaigns.  
The third reason is related to the need to comply with regulations. For example, company 
policy, the board or contract negotiations can dictate the need for testing the organization. 
This is quite often a case with government regulations that require the company to run phish-
ing assessments and report the results. [11] 
The fourth reason is that phishing simulations are conducted as part of a penetration test. It 
is becoming a common practise for companies to include phishing vectors in the penetration 
test. There are several ways how this can be done. For example, the phish leads to a shell as 
it is loaded with executable files or attachments, which contain a code that allows the pene-
tration test to connect to the corporate network. [33]  
Choosing a reason to begin with a simulated phishing campaign affects the way the program 
is structured, which phish and vendor to use, but also the expected outcome and results. 
After that has been established and the company has a clear understanding why they want 
to run a phishing program. The next step is to understand ethical, legal and psychological 
aspects of phishing.  
3.1.2 Ethical Considerations 
Some ethics committees have a belief that is not ethical to deceive people on research pur-
poses and that learning from experiments should not override participants' welfare because 
it may pose psychological damage or distress for the participants [34]. On the other hand, 
M.H. Boynton and colleagues [35] found in their research that necessary use of deception 
in research, when it is paired with correct experimenter training, conveys limited psycho-
logical harm to participants. Therefore, ethical considerations should not be neglected and 
taken into consideration when designing a phishing experiment.  
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Employees are seeing more malicious emails flooding their inboxes. According to the IBM's 
X-Force researchers also illustrated on Figure 2. more than half of all emails are spam and 
number of emails containing malicious attachments have increased tremendously. [5] Still 
some organizations are not conducting phishing experiments because these are unethical. 
This raises a challenge, how to conduct simulated phishing experiments in an ethical man-
ner? Similarly, El-Din raises a question “Can we deceive users, if our goal is to better un-
derstand how they are deceived by attackers?” To answer his question, he elaborates that 
deception is a relatively new method in security related research and, therefore, it provokes 
ethical debate. However, it has been widely used in psychological research and the use of 
deception in phishing research, if done correctly, can be safe [16] 
 
 
Figure 2. Spam Volume and Spam with Malicious Attachments – January 2015 Through  
December 2016 [5] 
Phishing assessment should be conducted in a manner that it does not pose psychological 
damage or distress for the participants. Individuals’ behaviour is unpredictable, and people 
react differently to phishing emails based on their personal traits, experience, environment, 
behavioural characteristics and, therefore; there is no unanimous response to a single email. 
[16][36] For example, participants are sent a phishing email requesting to pay off a debt to 
a debt collector. One participant can decide to call an attorney based on previous experience 
or existing fines. Another participant may just ignore this, because he or she is certain that 
there are no fines.  
An ethical phishing assessment does not attack participant or try to offend them in any mat-
ter. [31] For example, an ethical phishing email cannot contain a sentence “We have naked 
pictures of you, click here to delete”. Similarly, to protect participants’ privacy, their pass-
words must not be saved when gathering credentials on phishing sites. It is of great im-
portance, also because about half of people reuse the same password for different online 
accounts. [31][37][38] Saving participants’ passwords, therefore, may pose a threat to their 
wellbeing.  
The purpose of a phishing campaign is to provide employees with simulated environment 
where they can learn.[21] Employee should not feel stupid after the experiment. Employees 
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usually trust companies that they work for. This trust, however, cannot be established over-
night, but there is a possibility to brake it with unethical activities. Therefore, employees 
should be notified beforehand about the phishing campaign. Notifying employees will make 
them feel like part of the team. This can be done via sending an email to all employees and 
describing the purpose of the phishing program. The process should be also explained, and 
clear instructions given to the employees about what they should do when receiving a phish-
ing email.  
Another thing to consider would be the impact of phishing campaigns and trainings on the 
employee behaviour regarding opening the legitimate emails. For example, because of 
phishing campaign and trainings, an employee might be too scared to open an email form 
an unknown sender, which may be a legitimate query from a potential customer. Therefore, 
it should be well thought out how to educate employees to recognize phishing emails with-
out causing any unwanted actions regarding legitimate emails. 
To summarize, when conducting a phishing campaign, it should adhere to ethical principles 
and not pose any threat to participants’ wellbeing. The email content should not be offen-
sive, privacy of all participants must be protected. Furthermore, employees should be in-
formed beforehand about the awareness campaign and explained the process how to report 
phishing emails.  
3.1.3 Legal Considerations  
Phishing studies of users who participate in the experiments without informed consent can 
expose researchers to legal risks. The main legal issues that phishing assessments may con-
vey are violations of a provider’s terms of use, intellectual property rights and copyright 
infringement.[18] 
Soghoian [18] highlights that due to the complexity of laws, the possibility that the research 
activities may have legal implications is extremely high. Researchers should work closely 
with respective legal teams within their organization and when needed reach out for expert 
help. Therefore, it is crucial to understand the legal issues because researchers may inten-
tionally violate laws [39]. For example, a badly designed phishing experiment may lead to 
a circumstance where participants ask the researcher to be prosecuted [14]. The following 
chapter highlights some of the legal risks: data protection and privacy, collecting data, trade-
mark and copyright, terms of service; and how to mitigate these with contractual agree-
ments. 
Data Protection and Privacy  
El-Din [16] advices to comply with Human Rights Act 1998, Article 8 pertaining to the right 
to respect for private and family life, home, and correspondence. This includes also being 
mindful that the act must be balanced against the wider public interest and wellbeing. For 
example, El-Din describes how for their phishing experiments they used a new 'Pay As You 
Go' SIM card dedicated only for the experiments. It was kept secured in a locked room and 
after the study all data was deleted, and the SIM physically destroyed.  
This example illustrates a compliant process making sure that data is protected and accessi-
ble only for relevant people and that after the campaigns all data will be deleted perma-
nently. Likewise, all the reports should be kept secured and encrypted. 
Collecting Data from a Phishing Website 
According to Article 6 of the Council of Europe Cyber Convention, creating a simulated 
phishing website without the purpose to collect users’ data, especially their credentials, is 
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allowed [40]. Given that the website is public, other users may unintentionally visit the 
website and contact authorities without knowing that the website is created for phishing 
assessment purposes.  
In his research Kaspar Prei interviewed NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Ex-
cellence Legal department researcher Tomáš Minárik, who emphasises that if users’ creden-
tials are collected, this is most likely done without their consent, and personal data protection 
rules are therefore violated. To mitigate this risk, employers should add to the employee 
contracts that they might be subject to security assessments, including phishing. This may 
still be a problem if CIO-s (or other people in charge of conducting the experiments), are 
collecting personal email passwords as this is not in scope of the company security testing. 
[21] Another option would be not to collect password data in the first place because user 
name is sufficient enough to conclude that the user is likely willing to give out credentials.  
Trademark and Copyright 
The aim of phishing assessments is to gain accurate understanding, how users are behaving 
when facing phishing emails and therefore the same impersonating techniques that hackers 
are using need to be used by CIO-s and researches. For example, if a phishing website is 
pretending to be a well-known company’s website, there should be used a similar URL, 
logo, branding, names etc. This, however, may lead to infringement on a trademark and 
copyright rights.  
Hadnagy and Fincher [11] define that “Trademarks are the words, images, phrases, and 
symbols used by companies to indicate that their products or services belong to them.” They 
further elaborate that there are some requirements that a plaintiff must establish before a 
court will decide that someone has infringed on a trademark or used it in an unauthorised 
manner: [11] 
• The plaintiff must prove that there is a valid trademark;  
• The plaintiff must demonstrate that the same or a similar trademark was used by the 
defendant in relation to commercial activities without the plaintiff’s consent.  
• The plaintiff must demonstrate that such use of the trademark is likely to cause con-
fusion.  
They conclude that it is safer not to use trademarks for phishing purposes and not to use any 
real logos in phishing email simulations to advertise a product. Laws that govern the trade-
marks, however, differ by country and local legislation should be carefully checked to avoid 
any violations.  
However, some SaaS anti-phishing solution providers, e.g. PhishSim [41] offer to use tem-
plates of simulated websites, which raises a question, how this is legally possible? KnowBe4 
[42], which provides the claimed to be the world's largest security awareness training and 
simulated phishing platform, brings out on their website that trademarks could be displayed 
in simulated phishing emails if these are not used in a way that it confuses customers into 
believing that the services and/or goods originate with or are related to the company whose 
logo is featured. Additional way to mitigate the potential risks of confusion would be to 
launch an instructional video and or/a corrective landing page after the simulated attack, 
where customers are advised to be aware of phishing. Nevertheless, in the KnowBe4 website 
it is also clearly stated that they are not a law firm and therefore not authorised to provide 
such interpretations, but rather this is based on their experience.  
In conclusion, it is safer not to use trademarks for phishing purposes. However, if there is 
still a need to do that, legal advice should be sought to avoid any legal consequences.  
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Terms of Service 
As part of the phishing assessments there might be a need to gather large amount of user 
data from websites, such as Facebook, LinkedIn, using automated means. Websites may 
restrict using the bots to gather information. For example, in the terms and conditions of 
Facebook the following is stated:”You will not collect users' content or information, or oth-
erwise access Facebook, using automated means (such as harvesting bots, robots, spiders, 
or scrapers) without our prior permission“[43]. Therefore, automated means of data collec-
tion are not always allowed, and before automated information gathering respective web-
site’s Terms and Conditions should be reviewed and when applicable permission asked from 
the website owners.  
Agreement to Conduct Phishing Campaigns 
Given all the possible legal and ethical risks outlined in the above chapters, approvals must 
be obtained from the board prior the phishing assessments and an agreement signed to en-
sure data is protected and processed in accordance with all regulations. Companies have 
different internal policies that outline contractual needs and what should be included to the 
contract when sensitive data is being handled. Based on author experience, statement of 
confidentiality and clear roles and responsibilities between different parties should be the 
minimal two clauses that the agreement consists of. One example of what should be included 
to the contract can be found in the chapter “Signing a Contract” on page 38. 
Corporate policy, the board, and contract negotiations can also influence and dictate how 
the phishing assessment should to be conducted. In such cases it is good to determine a 
baseline, but compliance should not affect the testing to the lengths that results are affected. 
[11] 
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3.1.4 Choosing Phishing Email Difficulty Level  
Different Difficulty Levels of Phishing 
The common way to categorize phishing emails is that based on the difficulty level, i.e. the 
complexity of email content, which is further described below. Additionally, author will 
give an overview of categorization based on the goals of attackers and the attack type 
C. Hadnagy and M. Fincher [11] have broken down phishing emails into four categories 
based on the difficulty level of emails. The table below summarizes the different level 
phishes (Table 2).  
Table 2. Summarized the different level phishes 
Indicator Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
Greeting and 
Closing 
Impersonal Impersonal Personal Personal 
Grammar Misspellings Some misspell-
ings 
Overall good 
grammar 
No grammar 
mistakes 
Messaging Easy message, 
appeals on 
sense of greed, 
fear, or curios-
ity.  
More complex, 
but basic, ap-
peals on sense 
of greed, fear, 
or curiosity. 
Complex mes-
sage, appeals 
on fear or curi-
osity. Branding 
is used.  
Simple and to 
the point. 
Branding is 
used. 
Links Email body 
contains links 
Email body 
contains links 
Email body 
contains links 
Email body 
contains links 
Sender Unknown Unknown Appears legiti-
mate 
Appears legiti-
mate 
Example Email indicat-
ing that “you 
have inherited 
millions”, 
Email contain-
ing “results of 
some test”. 
Branded email 
to “sign up for 
some deal”. 
Attached “re-
cruitment 
plans” for re-
view sent to rel-
evant people. 
A level one phishing is the easiest to detect for most average users. The main identifying 
characteristics are impersonal greeting, bad grammar and spelling mistakes, unlikely cause 
(e.g. you have inherited a million), appeals to feelings of greed, fear or curiosity, bad links 
(embedded phishing URL) in the email body and unknown sender. These emails seem silly, 
but in some cases work because of fear and greed. [11] 
A level two phish is more complex and sophisticated and therefore harder to detect. The 
identifying characteristics are impersonal greeting, some bad grammar, messaging is more 
complex but rather basic, appeals to feelings of greed, fear and curiosity, bad links in body 
and unknown sender. Although there are many similarities with level one phishing, the main 
difference is the theme. The content is more personal and corporate and builds curiosity 
among targets by asking them, for example, to review some test results. [11] 
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A level three phish is about as complex and difficult to detect. Some of the indicators are 
personalized greeting, spelled properly, generally good grammar, complex message, bad 
links in body, sometimes a bad origin email addresses, but sender seems legitimate, in many 
cases branding. These emails seem real and the attackers are not appealing on fear but on 
curiosity. [11] 
A level four phish is very advanced, personal. The emails have no grammar mistakes and 
are targeted, so that the message seems relevant to victims and something they are expecting 
to receive, open and read. [11] 
Authors also highlight that when choosing the level for simulated phishing campaigns, one 
should start with the simpler phish and then based on the employee readiness move further 
with more difficult levels. 
Choosing the Email Content Difficulty Level 
Choosing the appropriate level for phishing assessments depends on, firstly, whether there 
have been any previous assessments conducted in the company and, secondly, at what level 
these have been carried out.  
As outlined by Fincher and Hadnagy [11] in case there have been no phishing assessments 
conducted in the company, then starting from simpler phishing (level 1) makes more sense. 
The reason being is that if more participants will recognise phishing email and report about 
it, they do not feel stupid and this helps to adopt the program more easily. When starting 
with a more difficult phishing campaign, it is likely that less participants will recognise the 
phishing email and they may feel stupid and that can cause negative emotions about the 
program [11]. In practise, however, simpler phishing campaigns (level 1) are used less, be-
cause criminals are nowadays using more advanced phishing emails. Therefore, to prepare 
employees to recognize real life phishing emails, the starting point should be to conduct 
more difficult phishing campaigns (level 2 or level 3). [11] 
In case there have been previously conducted phishing assessments in the company, earlier 
campaign results must be considered, and employee security awareness taken into consid-
eration. For example, if a level 1 phishing has been previously already carried out in the 
company and awareness trainings have been held, it does not make sense to repeat the level 
1 phishing campaign as there would be less learning for the participants.  
Choosing Participants and Group Size 
Conducting a phishing assessment among all employees maximises the validity of findings. 
However, regarding large companies it is not always realistic due to limited resources. For 
example, the assessment will impact the workload of the IT department as they are the point 
of contact for most queries. Different calculators exist to determine the ideal sample size, 
which would be representative of the target population with the desired confidence level. 
The latter is expressed as a percentage of times that different samples would produce the 
result. Likewise, quite often the sample is targeted, i.e. phishing emails are sent to different 
departments like Executive Management, Finance, Human resources etc. This enables to 
decrease the sample size and develop targeted phishing email content for more difficult 
(level 3 and 4) phishing emails. [27] In terms of validity of the results, it is also important 
to exclude people who are on holidays during the campaign period. When people are out of 
office, they do not click on the link not because they recognized a suspicious email, but 
simply because they are most probably not reading it in the first place and that affects the 
results.  
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3.1.5 Platform for Experiments  
Three main types of technical solutions exist to perform a phishing assessment: open-source 
platform, commercial software, SaaS solutions. In this chapter the main features of the se-
lected software solutions and what are the main advantages and disadvantages are described. 
Table 3. gives a summary of these solutions and outlines the main features. 
The overview of technical solutions is based on the framework developed by Fincher and 
Hadnagy [11], who conducted an Internet research about the existing software solutions. 
Additionally, they contacted five top commercial tool service providers and two open-
source project leads to carry out interviews with them to validate the findings about the 
outlined software features.  
The limitation to their findings is that this comparison is from 2015, which means it is three 
years old. This is a long time in the software life cycle and it is likely that the software 
solutions have developed over time. Author used his developed framework about relevant 
features and software solutions, however, checked one by one if there have been any 
changes in the functionalities of selected software solutions comparing to that outlined in 
the initial table and improved the table accordingly. For example, WOMBAT acquired 
ThreatSim in 2015, which resulted in changes regarding some functionalities.  
Additionally, author made improvements to the table by adding three new solutions provid-
ers (PhishSim, Gophish, Lucy), which were mentioned in the InfoSec Institute review [44] 
“Top 9 Free Phishing Simulators”. The reviews were done using the publicly available of-
ficial manuals and webpages for Rapid7 [45], ThreatSim [46], PhishMe [47], PhishLine 
[48], SET [33], Phishing Frenzy[49], Gophish [50], PhishSim [41], and Lucy [51]. 
Two additional features were added to complement the table: whether the software is free 
or commercial and whether it is on-premise or not. It was necessary to add the feature about 
cost as companies are operating based on the available budget. In terms of on-premise soft-
ware versus SaaS (cloud-based software), since personally identifiable information is han-
dled during the experiment, it may pose restrictions on the choice of software based on 
internal company policies and/or external regulations.  
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Table 3. Phishing software comparison chart 
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Free or commercial COMMCOMM
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* COMM FREE FREE FREE FREE COMM
On-premises? Y
N 
(SaaS)
N 
(SaaS) Y*
Y    
(O-S)
Y          
(O-S)
Y    
(O-S) N (SaaS) Y*
Feature
Allow for scheduled start times 
for campaigns? Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y
Allow for scheduled times to 
stop for campaigns? Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y
Allow for the use of logos from 
vendors to simulate phishing 
emails? Y Y Y** Y Y Y Y Y Y**
Allow for export of all your 
data? Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Handle incident response or 
reporting? N Y Y Y N N N Y* Y
If yes dose it have stats for 
who reported/clicked, 
reported/noclick? N/A Y Y Y N/A N/A N/A Y Y
Allow for SMSing test? N Y Y Y Y N N N Y
Allow for USB/media creation 
tests? Y Y Y Y Y N N Y# Y
Allow for spoofing of e-mail 
addresses? N Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y
Multistaged authentication? N/A N/A Y Y N/A N/A N/A N Y
Use Amazon Web Servers for 
load balancing? N/A N/A Y N N/A Y* N/A Y N/A
Have segregated instances for 
each customer? Y Y Y# Y N/A N N N N
Allow for importing from XLS, 
CSV? Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y
Has live tech support? Y Y Y Y N N N Y Y
Ability to run multiple 
simultaneous campaigns? N Y Y Y N Y N Y Y
Limitation on numbers of e-
mails sent in one campaign? N N N N N N N N N
 Y = Yes, the feature exists in 
this tool. N = No, the feature 
does not exist in this tool.                                                             
N/A = Not applicable; this 
feature doesn't apply at all to 
this tool.                                            
*, ** or # A footnote in the 
chart gives more information 
about that particular answer 
feature.                                                         
O-S = Open Source                       
SaaS = Software as a service           
COMM = Commercial
*Phishm
e free 
with 
limited 
feature 
SaaS ** 
Only 
w/permi
ssion             
#Upon 
request
*Possible 
On-
premises 
and SaaS
* 
Depense 
on your 
setup
*Requres 
Outlook 
plugin 
installatio
n         
#Requres 
commers
al licence
*Also 
possible 
SaaS        
**stated 
that this 
is illegal 
and your 
respons-
ibility
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Open-Source Solutions 
Regarding open-source software, three solutions were analysed: Phishing Frenzy, Social-
Engineering Toolkit (SET) and Gophish. The strength of these solutions is that all of them 
are on GitHub (environment for open-source software developers) and have been updated 
in 2018, which means that some bugs have been fixed recently. The main benefit of open-
source software is that its free to use. The downsize, however, is that it is more difficult to 
get timely support. 
Commercial Software 
Regarding commercial software, five solutions were analysed: Rapid7 Metasploit, 
ThreatSim, PhishMe, PhishLine and Lucy. The main benefit of commercial software is live 
technical support, which helps to troubleshoot possible issues and educate users if they need 
help in using the software. Additionally, some commercial software tools, e.g. Lucy, provide 
full service meaning they execute the whole phishing campaign for the company (campaign 
as a service). The cost is 1800$ per campaign. [52]. The downsize, however, is the cost of 
commercial software solutions.  
SaaS solutions 
Gartner [53] defines Software as a service (SaaS) as “Software that is owned, delivered and 
managed remotely by one or more providers. The provider delivers software based on one 
set of common code and data definitions that is consumed in a one-to-many model by all 
contracted customers at any time on a pay-for-use basis or as a subscription based on use 
metrics.” SaaS customers do not need to install any software or acquire new hardware, they 
only need a computer with a web browser connected to the Internet. Regarding SaaS, three 
solutions were analysed: ThreatSim, PhishMe, PhishLine.  
The benefit of SaaS solutions is that the user can start using the functionalities immediately 
and that no configuration is needed. Some of the existing SaaS solutions, e.g. ThreatSim, 
are also free to use. The downsize is that since during the phishing assessment sensitive data 
is being processed, many companies have concerns over data protection and security of SaaS 
solutions. In some cases, it can be prohibited by regulators to use SaaS for processing sen-
sitive data based on the classification of data and the company’s field of activity. 
In conclusion, each of the solution type has its pros and cons. Prior choosing the most ap-
propriate solution, companies should first define their available budget for phishing assess-
ments, in-house technical capabilities, time and people resources. They should also consider 
the internal and external data protection policies to determine whether it is allowed to use 
SaaS for processing sensitive data and based on the set criteria look for the appropriate so-
lution. For example, if the company has limited budget and is not allowed to use SaaS for 
processing sensitive data but on the other hand has in-house IT-department to manage the 
phishing campaigns; open source solution would be most appropriate.  
 
3.1.6 Informing Employees 
Learning Website for Phishing 
The purpose of the learning website is to educate participants about phishing and how to 
recognise phishing emails. Acquisti [20] and his colleagues have developed an interactive 
game called “Anti-Phishing Phil” that teaches users to avoid falling for phishing attacks.  
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They conducted a research to evaluate the impact of the game on user’s awareness and con-
cluded that after playing the game users were able to more accurately and quickly distin-
guish phishing websites from legitimate websites and that they retain knowledge learned 
from the game.  
Developing websites for anti-phishing user education is widely used. Many solution provid-
ers, e.g. PhishMe, ThreatSim and some other commercial anti-phishing solution providers 
offer ready-made interactive learning websites as part of their anti-phishing solution.  
Security Awareness Company [54] offers a similar free interactive training solution called 
Phishing ILM, which is in SCORM (Sharable Content Object Reference Model) format. 
The solution does not work in a typical browser and LMS (Learning Management System) 
application is needed for online learning delivery. Certain limitations exist with regard to 
altering some aspects of Phishing ILM, so before using it, the users should familiarize them-
selves with the licensing conditions. [55]  
One way to use Phishing IML is to run it on Moodle software (it was also tested by author), 
which enables to track whether users have completed the training. [56] The first step is to 
install Moodle [57] and the second step to import SCROM container to Moodle [58] Phish-
ing LMS provides information about phishing, phishing indicators, lessons from Craigslist 
Scam and gives multiple examples and recommendations how to recognize phishing emails 
(see Figure 3.)  
 
 
Figure 3. SAC Phishing interactive learning module. 
Using an interactive learning environment is a practical way to ensure that participants have 
spent time on the website and passed different exercises. In contrast, using a regular learning 
website does not allow to evaluate if users have read through the content or merely clicked 
on the link [17]. 
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Informing Participants Prior the Campaign 
As it was discussed before, because of the legal, ethical and psychological considerations 
all employees must be informed about the simulated phishing assessments. This is also em-
phasised by Caputo and colleagues [17]. Resnik and Finn [22] argue that if participants are 
not aware that they are enrolled in a research study, this could add to their anger and frus-
tration. In contrast, briefing the participants is believed to have a long-lasting positive im-
pact if the briefing is structured in a way that the subject learns how to avoid falling for real 
phishing attacks [13]. 
The notification email serves the following purposes: 
• Describe what is phishing and the possible consequences of phishing to the company. 
• The role of the employee.  
• Describe the phishing prevention program and introduce the learning website. 
• Provide an overview of the internal process about reporting phishing emails. 
It is important to let the employees know that the phishing experiment will not result in any 
negative consequences if they fall for the simulated phishing attack. One example of the 
notification email following the four outlined principles can be found in San José State Uni-
versity webpage [59] in English. 
In some studies participants are not briefed about the simulated phishing assessments, for 
example Kaspar Prei did not send out a notification email prior to the campaign [21]. One 
could argue that sending the notification email may impact the research results because peo-
ple are more alert to receive a simulated phishing email. Therefore, author decided to inves-
tigate in the qualitative research part of this study, whether the users remembered receiving 
the notification email.  
Informing Participants After the Experiment 
Similarly, the participants should be provided with additional information concerning their 
participation in the phishing assessment after the experiments are concluded [22] A notifi-
cation email should be sent to all phishing campaign participants without revealing their 
identity to other participants, i.e. they should be in Bcc (blind carbon copy).  
The notification email serves the following purposes:  
• Information about the simulated phishing email: 
o Letting the employees know the email address from where the phishing email 
was sent and that they were not infected with malware. 
o Letting them know that passwords were not collected, in case their credentials 
were asked. 
o Attaching a screenshot of the actual phishing email.  
• Description of phishing: 
o How to recognise phishing emails, including a link to the learning website.  
o The role of employees, e.g. in reporting suspicious emails. 
o The possible consequences of not reporting suspicious emails. 
Informing employees is crucial not only due to ethical, psychological and legal reasons, but 
it also helps to educate employees about phishing, how to recognise phishing emails and 
what to do when receiving a suspicious email. To maximise the impact and learning form 
the simulated phishing campaigns, the emails should consist of recognisable characteristics 
that are typical to real phishing emails. Sending out flawlessly written emails does not help 
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the employees to learn to detect phishing emails. Furthermore, employees should be intro-
duced to learning websites and/or provide them with tools for independent learning.  
Another option is to debrief participants about the phishing assessment not after the assess-
ment has been concluded for all participants but immediately after they have clicked on the 
link. The limitation to this approach is that participants may inform their colleagues, which 
affects the results. [21] 
3.1.7 Creating Phishing Content 
Phishing Email 
The next step would be to put together email content. Many simulated phishing solutions 
come with the email and landing page templates, such as Phishing Frenzy [60], PhishSim 
[41] and Gophish [50]. For illustrative purposes, author tested the PhishSim solution. 
Screenshot of Facebook phishing template preview generated with the help of PhisSim can 
be seen Figure 4. Some solution providers, such as Lucy [51], offer customizable phishing 
templates or a possibility to create templates from the scratch. 
Phishing emails have different topics, such as resetting a password to induce users to click 
on the phishing links [61]. However, one should bear in mind what is the selected difficulty 
level of the email content and based on that choose a relevant topic. For example, if the aim 
is to send out level 3 phishing emails, the content should be relevant and reflect the real-life 
situation. When creating a content for the phishing email, it is important to be conscious that 
it is a phishing email and that there must be recognizable mistakes depending on the chosen 
difficulty level. The mistakes help to educate employees regarding recognizing certain char-
acteristics that they should pay attention to when receiving suspicious emails. Even though 
for the writer the mistakes may seem obvious, in reality this is not the case [11]. 
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Figure 4. PhishSim screenshot of email template review 
 
Spear Phishing Email 
Spear phishing is a high priority security concern to businesses and it continues to grow as 
a problem [3], [4]. Therefore, more spear phishing assessments should be conducted also 
among employees. A Cisco report [62] highlights that spear phishing attacks are much more 
successful in terms of the open rate, click through rate and monetary value (see Figure 5.) 
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Figure 5. Economic comparison between Mass Phishing and Spear Phishing [62]  
The main difference between the phishing email and spear phishing email content is that 
since the spear phishing email is more targeted, additional time should be allocated to gather 
personal information about the targets to create relevant messages. Information can be gath-
ered from different pages, e.g., Profile engine[63] and Google. Same email templates could 
be utilized for spear phishing as for phishing experiments.  
Sending out simulated phishing emails to all targets at once is less time-consuming for the 
company comparing to sending out spear phishing emails one by one. However, as dis-
cussed before the loss from the spear phishing attacks is higher and employees should be 
educated to recognize both types of emails. Therefore, both phishing and simulated phishing 
campaigns should be conducted for better employee education.  
Creating Landing Page 
In general, landing pages can be divided into four categories: credential catering, exploit, 
page not found and instant notification about phishing simulation. In the below the four 
different approaches are described:  
• Credential catering. The phishing email link leads to a website that harvests creden-
tials. To copy the exact company login page HTTrack, which is a website copy tool, 
can be used [64]. Another option is to use pre-built website templates [41]. 
ThreatSim is also offering multiple landing pages, which are very similar to real 
pages with only URL path being different.  
• Exploit. The phish leads to a shell as it is loaded with executable files or attachments, 
which contain a code that allows the penetration test to connect to the corporate 
network. 
• Page not found. The destination of the phishing link is a 404 Error Page, and the 
employee is not instantly alerted that he or she is part of the phishing experiment.  
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• Instant notification about the phishing simulation When clicking on a phishing link 
it directs to the learning website and employees are notified about the campaign im-
mediately, which is likely to decrease anxiety and distress. The limitation of this 
approach is that some employees may spread a word about the simulated phishing 
attack and that, in return, affects the results. [21]  
Testing Technical Setup 
End-to-end verification must be done before the phishing campaign to make sure and double 
check that all the components, including DNS configuration, email servers, phishing plat-
form and target SMTP spam filter or target computer antivirus protection software are fully 
functioning. It is also important to click on the links embedded in the test email to verify 
that a unique click is registered in the phishing platform. In case the phishing email contains 
attachments then these need to be tested with the company’s antivirus protection software. 
3.2 During Email Phishing Campaign  
The simulated phishing campaign day should go smoothly if all preparations are done cor-
rectly. On the campaign day relevant stakeholders should be informed about the campaign 
being launched. In terms of internal partners, IT helpdesk should be reminded about the 
campaign and in terms of external partners, administrative bodies, e.g. national CERT, 
should also be notified. This is needed, because in case employees would turn directly to 
CERT, they would be prepared and not start an official investigation process. It is recom-
mended to inform CERT before the phishing campaign day, especially when contacting 
them for the first time.  
After the internal and external parties have been briefed the next step is to launch the email 
phishing campaign. During the campaign, the wellbeing of participants should be consid-
ered, and all their queries answered. The campaign will be concluded by sending an in-
formative email to participants.  
3.3 After Launching Phishing Campaign  
3.3.1 Analysing Results 
Analysing the phishing campaign results enables the company to assess the security aware-
ness of employees and helps to understand how vulnerable they are to phishing attacks. This 
gives the baseline for employee education and for future assessments. The following statis-
tics should be considered relevant to draw conclusions: [11][17][65] 
• The number of participants who clicked on the link embedded to a phishing email. 
This number illustrates the vulnerability of the company to attacks, giving insights 
into how many people may put the company at risk and how many employees should 
be further educated.  
• The number of people who reported the suspicious emails. This is an important sta-
tistic, because deleting an email is not helping to solve the problem. Employees 
should act and report the emails as soon as they receive these to respective depart-
ments to prevent future attacks. 
It is important to gather statistics about how many people “caught” the phishing email and 
reported it, these people can be divided into four categories. Firstly, how many people 
clicked on the phishing link and did not report it. Secondly, the number of people who 
clicked on the link but also reported it. Thirdly, how many people did not click and did not 
32 
 
report and lastly, number of people who did not click and did report about the suspicious 
email. [11] 
The highest risk to the company comes from the people who clicked on the phishing link 
but did not report. These employees need the most training and help. People who clicked on 
the phishing link and still reported can be considered as a positive outcome. Although these 
people clicked on the phishing link, they realized the risk and ended up taking a positive 
step to report it. People who neither clicked nor reported the email are not imposing a sub-
stantial risk to the company but they should be educated that reporting is a needed step and 
should not be overlooked. People who did not click on the phishing link and reported it are 
behaving in a manner that a company wants them to behave. They did not fall for the phish-
ing email and furthermore they reported it to save others. [11] 
Such categorisation gives guidelines how to further educate employees and what should be 
the focus of training. For example, if majority of people did not click on the phishing link 
but they also did not report it, the focus should be on educating people why reporting is of 
great importance and how it helps to prevent future attacks.  
3.3.2 Interviewing Participants 
In addition to statistical reports, which merely give an overview of the situation, many re-
searchers have interviewed the participants after the phishing assessments to better under-
stand the motives behind people’s behaviour [21][17][19]. Interviews allow to investigate 
why people took the specific actions during the phishing campaign and this gives valuable 
insights to detect the shortcomings within the awareness programs and to better design fu-
ture campaigns. For more structured interviewing three groups of people based on their be-
haviour could be distinguished[17]: 
• All-clickers. These are people who click links regardless of previous awareness 
trainings;  
• Non-clickers. These are people who do not click links at all;  
• The rest. These are people who do not exhibit consistent clicking behaviour.  
Interview investigation, including developing the interview guide and dividing participants 
into groups, is discussed in more detail on Chapter 4.3 Interview Investigation (Qualitative 
research). 
3.4 New Proposed Consolidated Guidelines for Email Phishing Experi-
ment 
Author has created the guidelines for phishing experiments based on the existing studies and 
literature. The guidelines consist of three parts: Pre-launching phishing campaign; Launch-
ing Phishing campaign and Post- Launching Phishing campaign. To visualize the different 
steps author created a diagram in Unified Modeling Language (UML) format, which can be 
found in Appendix A – New Proposed Consolidated Guideline for Email Phishing Experi-
ment and a one-pager to summarize all the relevant steps, which can be found in Appendix 
J – One-Pager Checklist. The circles illustrate the different phases of the phishing campaign 
from the beginning to the end. Additional information and things to consider are brought 
out with keywords in the squares connected to the circles with dotted lines to supplement 
the steps. This diagram is supporting Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6.  
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4 Methodology 
The aim of this research is to explore how to conduct simulated phishing experiments and 
to create consolidated guidelines that companies could implement. For that purpose, one 
quantitative and one qualitative study were conducted to test and improve the composed 
guidelines, which were put together based on the existing literature and author’s experience. 
This chapter gives an overview of the main concepts, research designs, sample size and 
some reflections on reliability and validity.  
4.1.1 Definition of Concepts 
Phishing Campaign. In the light of this research, the phishing campaign is defined sending 
out an email or several emails to get participants to click on a link that is embedded to the 
email, to register his or her public IP, browser agent, date and time. Each link is unique and 
links back to participants, which means that people who click on the link can be recognized. 
Phishing Experiment (Assesment). In the light of this research, the phishing experiment re-
fers to one or several assessment campaigns conducted among the same target group in 
distinct time periods using different emails with the purpose to investigate behavioural pat-
terns of the selected targets. One experiment can consist of several campaigns. 
4.2 Phishing Experiments (Quantitative research) 
4.2.1 Experimental Research Design 
Experimental research has been defined as a group of techniques where the researcher es-
tablishes different conditions for the experiment subjects and it maximises the information 
that can be obtained on the cause-effect relationship.[66] It is important to distinguish be-
tween the random selection and the random assignment of participants to further define the 
type of the research design. The random selection is the process of randomly choosing par-
ticipants to the experiment, e.g. everyone has an equal chance to be selected. The random 
assignment means that every participant has an equal chance of being assigned into different 
experimental groups. Experimental research designs have one characteristic in common, 
namely, that participants are assigned randomly to treatment conditions. When it is not pos-
sible to randomly assign people to groups, it results in the quasi-experimental study.[67] 
Concerning this research the sample (employees of Company X) was predetermined, how-
ever, participants were randomly assigned to groups, which means that the study can be 
defined as an experimental study.  
Different experimental research designs exist, for example Post-test, Only Design, Pretest-
Post-Test Only Design, Solomon Four Group Design, Factorial Design, Randomized Block 
Design and Crossover Design. For the purposes of this study, author decided to use Cross-
over Design as it enables to measure whether there is a correlation between the email diffi-
culty level and the click rate. Subjects of this design receive all the same exposures (phishing 
emails) that are being investigated over time and are randomly assigned to different orders 
of the exposures. The groups compared have an equal distribution of characteristics and the 
subjects that are exposed to different conditions have a high level of similarity. In other 
words, the groups are rather similar in terms of participants and they are exposed to the 
different conditions (email difficulty levels) over time (see Figure 6). 
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Figure 6. Illustration of The Design and Analysis of a Crossover Trial [68] 
The concern, however, over this design has been that the response to the second condition 
may be influenced by their experience with the first exposure.[66] In terms of phishing ex-
periments Finn and Jakobsson [31] argue that choosing two distinct types of emails gives 
more statistical significance, under the assumption that each campaign is independent, i.e. 
that the participants do not become smarter because of the previous experiment. They be-
lieve that this assumption is fair because users are exposed to numerous phishing attacks 
during their normal Internet use and is likely to be already affected by the unknown number 
of phishing attacks they already encountered.  
To conduct the additional spear phishing experiment, author utilized single-subject quasi-
experimental research design, i.e. subjects were not randomly selected, and data was col-
lected on each subject/participant and individually analysed. For this purpose, A-B design 
was implemented. In this design, baseline measures were obtained (information about the 
targets) and then the experiment was conducted (spear phishing emails) to measure if there 
was an effect after the experiment. The criticism on this design is that its results may be 
subjects to numerous competing explanations.[67] 
Regarding experimental standards, internal and external validity should be considered. In-
ternal validity is the degree to which measured differences are a result of the manipulation. 
When changes, that can be directly attributed to the effects of the exposure, occur; the study 
has internal validity. External validity refers to the degree to which the experiment results 
can be generalized and are applicable to other groups and settings, meaning that the setting, 
intervention and measures should be thoroughly described. Replication helps to establish 
reliability of previous findings and define the generality under different conditions.[67] Both 
internal and external validity are considered when conducting the experiments. 
4.2.2 Sample size and research period 
Prior to deciding a sample size, a target population (e.g. all employees) needs to be identified 
and then a group size that would be representative enough can be determined [69]. The 
higher the sample, the more generalizable are the results. Small sample size limits measuring 
the effect of the research and may lead to biased results. [61] Regarding this study the target 
population is more than 250 people (all employees of Company X) and the sample size 53 
people. The sample size was pre-determined by the Company X, therefore; one could argue 
that this could decrease the validity of the results. The experiments were conducted between 
June 2017 and September 2017. The first campaign took place in the end of June, the second 
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campaign in the beginning of September and the spear phishing experiment in the middle 
of June 2017.  
4.3 Interview Investigation (Qualitative research)  
4.3.1 Qualitative Interview 
The chosen qualitative interview method helps us to set goals how to interpret the general 
orientation how we should conduct the research [70] and is best suited to answer the research 
question: “How people react to simulated email phishing experiments?” Therefore, this 
qualitative interview research is concerned with words and interpretations of the social 
world and how people interpret the experiment. As explained by Hennik and his colleagues 
[71], the objective of qualitative research is to acquire understanding of underlying reasons, 
beliefs and motivations of a subject matter.  
The present research is an analysis of a single company, Company X. Each company has its 
own culture and established systems, shaping the way people react to different situations. 
The design chosen for this research is a case study, which is concerned with “the complexity 
and particular nature of the case in question”[70]. The criticism of a case study is that find-
ings deriving from it cannot be generalized [70]. The results cannot be generalised to the 
entire company, but it gives some confidence that this phishing process can provide more 
insights on how to conduct phishing experiments, in the context of the Company X, which 
is why case study design is chosen. 
4.3.2 Interview Investigation  
Kvale [72] highlights seven stages of a qualitative interview; thematizing, designing, inter-
viewing, transcribing, analysing, verifying and reporting. The steps were considered in plan-
ning the design of this study. Firstly, a pre-knowledge of the subject was obtained by con-
sidering the existing literature and developing theoretical understanding on how to conduct 
and design phishing experiments. Secondly the quantitative analysis of reports of the phish-
ing experiment gave background information about the behaviour of interviewees, e.g. 
whether they clicked on the phishing emails, did they report back to the IT helpdesk that 
they received a suspicious email or not and how their conduct differed from the average 
behaviour of the studied group.  
To stimulate a flow of conversation and get better understanding of how people react to 
phishing experiments, author decided not to completely structure the interview and thus a 
semi-structured interview was chosen. Such an approach means that the interviewer has a 
series of questions in form of an interview guide, but the interviewer may choose the se-
quence of questions and ask further questions in response to the statements of the interview-
ees [70]. Based on the gathered knowledge, a preliminary research guide was developed.  
The questions chosen for this interview investigation are based on [72]: firstly, “introducing 
questions”, to start a conversation and make people think about the experiment, secondly 
“probing questions” to acquire deeper knowledge on what they think of the phishing cam-
paign, thirdly “specifying questions” to acquire knowledge about their behaviour about dif-
ferent phishing campaigns, fourthly “direct questions” to understand what is central to them. 
Some questions are also taken from the research guide developed by Caputo and his collages 
“Going Spear Phishing: Exploring Embedded Training and Awareness” [17]. 
The overall criticism of the semi-structured interview method has been that the interview 
statements can be ambiguous and contradictory and that the findings may not be intersub-
jectively reproducible.[72] 
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4.3.3 The Process of Selecting Interviewees 
The interviewees are selected amongst the group who participated in the experiments. In 
total 54 people participated in the two experiments. One person participated in both experi-
ments. The selection of interviewees for the research was purposive, i.e. the sampling was 
made in a strategic way as proposed by Bryman [70]. In terms of finding interviewees for 
the research, it was necessary to define and distinguish separate groups of people who par-
ticipated on Experiment I and Experiment II. In terms of deciding how to divide interviews 
into groups, the methodology of Caputo and his Colleagues was used [17]. Namely, people 
were divided into groups based on whether they had clicked on the phishing links or not. 
For more details, see Chapter 3.3.2. The primary goal of such a division is to evaluate how 
those people who clicked on the email differ from those who did not. Also, to evaluate if 
participating in Experiment I affected participants’ behaviour during Experiment II.  
Table 4. summarizes the distinct groups. People who clicked on the phishing email, which 
was designed to be more easily recognizable (Group A); people who clicked on the phishing 
email, which was designed to be more difficult to recognize (Group B); people who clicked 
on both emails (Group C) and people who did not click on neither of the emails (Group D). 
The last group consists of two participants of Experiment II, who clicked on the spear phish-
ing email links.  
Table 4. Interview group description  
 Experiment I Experiment II 
Group A Clicked on the phishing link (Type Y email)   
Group B Clicked on the phishing link (Type X email)   
Group C Clicked on both phishing links (Type X and 
Type Y email)  
 
Group D Did not click on the phishing links   
Group E  Clicked on the spear- 
phishing email link 
Given that interviews are a qualitative part of the research and the focus is on gaining in-
depth knowledge of the phishing experiment from the perspective of participants and not to 
make statistical generalizations, it was decided to select two interviewees from each of the 
group and focus on a few subjects, which makes possible to spend more time on the analysis 
and work out consistent and recurrent patterns [72]. Therefore, it was decided to interview 
ten people. However, out of the 53 people, who participated in Experiment I, only one em-
ployee clicked on both emails (Group C), which meant that it was not possible to choose 
two representatives from that group. In addition, only one person agreed to be interviewed 
from Group A and one person from Group B. In total seven interviewees were therefore 
conducted.  
Regarding Groups A, B, C, D (Experiment I participants); the five interviewees were ran-
domly selected, meaning that all the email addresses were numbered, and random number 
generation application (random.org) was used. Regrading Group E (Experiment II partici-
pants), it was not possible to randomly select the interviews as only two employees partici-
pated in the spear phishing experiment. Prior emailing the interviewees a written consent 
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was obtained via email from the CTO of Company confirming that these people can be 
contacted to conduct this research. After obtaining the consent, the seven selected employ-
ees were contacted via email and suitable times were agreed for interviews.  
4.3.4 Interview Process 
The interviews were conducted from December 2017 to March 2018. The interviews were 
carried out in different minimal noise environments, e.g. meeting rooms to guarantee pri-
vacy and avoid disturbances. Prior the interview, author introduced himself and outlined the 
objectives of this research along with explaining the concept `phishing experiment`. Inter-
viewees were encouraged not to restrict themselves to answering strictly to the interview 
questions, but to consider different angles of the subject matter and elaborate on the topic 
as much as possible. To create a natural flow of discussion reflecting upon the interviewees’ 
distinct experience and viewpoints, the order of asking the questions was not pre-deter-
mined. The interviews lasted between 40 minutes and one hour and these were conducted 
in Estonian. After the interviews content analysis was performed to identify major themes 
and topics that exhibited a viewpoint or opinion relevant to the research question.  
4.3.5 Ethical Issues 
Kvale [72], outlines ethical questions that one should consider prior conducting an inter-
view, such as: what is the benefit of the study, how to obtain consent from interviewees, 
how to protect their confidentiality and how will the researcher affect the study. These ques-
tions were taken into consideration while designing the research questions and the process, 
meaning an introduction email was written explaining the benefits of this research to poten-
tial interviewees and explaining them that the interview is fully confidential, and interpre-
tations are anonymous and that their personal data will not be stored. The questions are 
being asked without trying to influence the way people answer to the questions but let them 
have natural flow of conversations and their own interpretations and maintain critical per-
spective on the obtained knowledge. Prior the interviews, all the participants were asked if 
the interview can be recorded and after the analysis all the recordings were deleted. 
4.3.6 Reflections on Reliability and Validity  
The two things to consider in terms of evaluating if the research is scientific are reliability 
and validity. To make a research valid, the choices made throughout the process should be 
explained and transparent. Reliability is concerned with the consistency of the findings; in 
other words, whether the results of the research can be repeated [70][72]. Therefore, the 
process, gathered data and interpretations on the results should be well exemplified and 
transparent for the readers to follow. These principles were followed throughout this re-
search. 
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5 Implementation of an Email Phishing Experiment 
As part of the first experiment, two phishing campaigns were conducted in the selected 
company, which is called Company X to protect the anonymity of the company. The first 
campaign was conducted in June 2017 and the second one in September 2017. This chapter 
gives an overview of what to consider prior the campaigns, how to choose a platform, tech-
nical set up, how to create phishing email content and gives an overview of the experiment 
results.  
5.1 Before Launching Email Phishing Campaign  
5.1.1 Legal Considerations 
Signing a Contract 
It was discussed in Chapter 3.1.3 that due to the complexity of laws, the possibility that the 
research activities may have legal implications is extremely high. It should be consulted 
with legal advisors on how to conduct the assessment compliantly and what contracts should 
be in place. In most of the cases if phishing experiments are conducted contracts are signed 
with the service provider as sensitive data is being handled. This triggers a need to sign a 
contract with the board member of the Company, particularly if the experiments are con-
ducted by a third party. The contract may vary by company, but it should outline the respon-
sibilities and obligations of both parties, consisting the following information, which was 
also included to the contract signed for this case study: 
• Campaign timeframe, including dates. 
• Target group size and selection. The company will provide the email addresses of 
employees chosen for the assessment. Concerning this experiment, 53 employees 
were selected by the company to participate in this experiment.  
• Phishing email difficulty level. The appropriate difficulty level of phishing emails 
based on the categorization by C. Hadnagy and M. Fincher, who categorized these 
into level 1, 2, 3 and 4 attacks [11]. The level should be chosen based on employee 
security awareness.  
• Data Protection. What type of sensitive information and PII (personally identifiable 
information) is collected and how data is protected. Concerning this experiment, the 
information that was collected and stored was unique trackable link to identify the 
employee, IP address and browser type. 
• Ethical guidelines for conducting the experiments, namely that the email content 
should not be offensive and cause any distress to participants. Examples: “We have 
naked pictures of you”, “You have won a lottery”, “Your aunt got into an accident”, 
etc. 
• Defining roles and responsibilities. The company is responsible for registering inci-
dents regarding the phishing experiments and forwarding this information to the ap-
propriate roles within the company as set in the company policy. Concerning this 
research, the responsible point of contact for such incidents was the IT Helpdesk.  
• Notifying participants. The responsibility of the Company is to send out an informa-
tive email on the same day after the phishing experiment has been concluded. The 
purpose is, firstly, to inform the participants that they were included into the testing 
sample and if they clicked on the email their computers were not affected. Secondly, 
to give further instructions and guidelines on how to recognize phishing emails in 
the future.  
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• An agreement that after the experiment a report describing the process of phishing 
experiment, the main results and suggestions for improvement will be sent to the 
Company.  
In addition to the above-mentioned terms and conditions, the Company should notify the 
employees also prior the phishing experiment, because of the legal, ethical and psychologi-
cal considerations. Regarding this case study the company had sent out the notification prior 
signing this agreement, which meant it was not relevant to add this to the agreement.  
Establishing the agreement and outlining the main responsibilities, obligations and the pro-
cess itself will also give a framework to thoroughly think through the necessary steps, level 
of engagement with the Company and handling of sensitive data to ensure all the relevant 
steps are taken to successfully conduct the phishing experiment.  
5.1.2 Choosing Phishing Email Difficulty Level  
It was discussed in the Chapter 3.1.4 that choosing the appropriate email difficulty level for 
phishing assessments depends on employee security awareness and whether any assess-
ments have been previously conducted in the company. This chapter gives an overview of 
the current situation in Company X, how the appropriate email difficulty level was chosen 
and how participants were divided into groups.  
Current Situation of Company X 
Company X is selected as a target company for the purposes of this study. It can be catego-
rised, in the Estonian context, as a large enterprise with more than 250 full time employees 
based in Estonia. It is mainly an ICT and online service company with a large customer base 
and revenue of more than one billion euros. 
This chapter aims to analyse the previously conducted phishing assessments in Company X. 
Obtaining background information helps to design appropriate phishing campaigns to meet 
the company needs considering employee security awareness. There is no need to evaluate 
uneducated employees with the most difficult simulated attacks or vice versa, conduct re-
peatedly the same level assessments.  
Analysis of previously conducted phishing assessment I 
During May 2016, a level 3 phishing attack simulation was conducted in Company X. The 
used domain and the content on the landing website were similar to those of Company X 
website. The employees were lured to a website under the control of testers impersonating 
an internal and trusted person, who was also inviting the employees to fill in a web form 
with user credentials. 
Phishing email was sent to 63 employees, of whom 3 were out of office based on their 
automatic email replies. Around 51% of all email recipients fell for the phishing attack, 
meaning that clicked on email link, which illustrates the vulnerability of the company to 
phishing attacks. 
Around 36% of all email recipients entered their user credentials into the phishing form. 
Hijacking usernames and passwords provides direct access to company’s confidential data 
like trade secrets, know-how and personal data.  
Observations made within Company X during the session revealed that none of the phishing 
mail recipients noticed the fake domain name, none of them found collecting passwords 
suspicious and none of them informed the IT Helpdesk.  
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Similarly, to the theft of credentials, registering a lookalike domain name gives the possi-
bility to start active email communication with at least one internal employee to solicit more 
confidential information. 
Security Awareness Training 
After the phishing assessment employees were asked to participate in a mandatory aware-
ness training. The training gave an overview of phishing, the purpose of phishing emails, 
described the criminals behind the phishing attacks and their goals and how to recognise 
phishing emails.  
Analysis of Previously Conducted Phishing Assessment II  
During October 2016, a level 2 phishing attack simulation was conducted in Company X. 
For the second simulation, testers impersonated a fictive debt collection company and for-
warded a claim notice with a link to file, which lured the employees to execute a “malicious” 
macro script mimicking. This kind of attack software could lead to data theft, remote con-
trolling of the computer or blackmailing after encrypting all user data with ransomware. 
Phishing email was sent to 63 employees, of whom 4 were out of office based on their 
automatic email replies. The results were that 16% of all recipients opened the email and 
clicked on the link and 13 employees reported the suspicious email. 
Impact of the Security Awareness Training 
The results of the two experiments imply that awareness testing and subsequent training had 
an impact on the employee behaviour. Regarding the first simulated phishing email, 36% of 
participants inserted their credentials to simulated phishing site, whereas regarding the sec-
ond simulated email, which took place after the training, only 16% fell for it. One must also 
consider that the phishing attacks were with different purpose and level, which does not 
allow to draw final conclusions without further testing.  
Choosing the Email Content Difficulty Level in Company X 
As previous assessments and security training had been conducted in Company X, author 
together with the CTO of Company X decided to choose more advanced content for the 
purposes of the experiment (level 2 and level 3 phishing emails). It was decided to imple-
ment crossover research design, divide participants randomly into Group K and Group L 
and to send out two distinct types of emails (Type X and Type Y) with the purpose to gain 
more statistical significance as discussed in the Chapter 4.2.1. Table 5. summarizes what 
type of email was sent to each group and when.  
Table 5. Summary of experiments, target groups and email types 
 Experiment I (Phishing) 
 Campaign I (29.06.2017) Campaign II (06.09.2017) 
Group K Type X (level 3) Type Y2 (level 2) 
Group L Type Y1 (level 2) Type X (level 3) 
After Campaign I emails were sent out at 8:30 in the morning on the campaign day, one of 
the participants forwarded the simulated phishing email to 150 other employees at 14:30 the 
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same day. Therefore, an additional phishing email content (Type Y2), which is correspond-
ing to the same difficulty level, was put together for Campaign II. This is a limitation to this 
research findings and may affect the results.  
Choosing Participants and Group Size 
As it was discussed in Chapter 4.2.2. conducting a phishing assessment among all employ-
ees maximises the validity of findings, however, regarding this experiment the sample size 
(53 people) was pre-decided by the company. The participants were chosen from different 
departments and those people who were out of office during the campaign period were ex-
cluded from the sample.  
5.1.3 Informing Employees 
Learning Website for Phishing 
There was no need to develop an additional learning platform as Company X already had 
internal learning website, where employees can find more information about phishing and 
how to recognize phishing emails. Company X learning solution followed the same princi-
ples discussed in chapter Learning Website for Phishing on page 25.  
Informing Employees Prior the Experiment 
All participants were briefed two months before the experiments. The notification email 
described what is phishing, what can be consequences of phishing and what is the role of 
employees in this. It described the phishing prevention program and provided an overview 
what to do and to whom to report when receiving a suspicious email. The email also included 
the link to the learning website. The email was structured in a way that the participants could 
learn how to avoid falling for phishing attacks and it aimed to build positive impact.  
5.1.4 Choosing a Platform and Technical set up 
As it was discussed in the Chapter 3.1.5 different technical solutions exist to perform a 
phishing assessment: open-source platform, commercial software, SaaS solutions. This 
chapter gives an overview of how it was determined what platform to use for Company X 
and describes step by step how to technically set up the campaigns.  
Application Platform 
Before choosing a platform, it is important to define the requirements for the platform. Re-
garding the phishing experiments, the requirements were: 
• Open-source 
• Easy to use 
o Graphical user interface 
o Installation guides 
o Tutorial videos or documentation 
• Campaign management 
o Ability to develop multiple campaigns with different parameters 
o Ability to view detailed campaign statistics 
o Automatic unique target page generation and click registration  
Based on the established requirements, Phishing Frenzy [49] was chosen to be the platform 
for both phishing assessments. It consists of traditional application components like Apache, 
MySQL, PHP5, Ruby, Ruby’s gems, Redis and Sidekiq. The installation was done using the 
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guidelines provided in the official installation instruction, “Ubuntu Server 16.04.2 LTS 
x64”, which is published at their website. As a variation from the official instruction, author 
used Sendmail for sending our emails, because sending emails in the background queue was 
not properly working and unknown error message appeared. To ensure the administrators 
web interface access was limited to specific IP. In addition to ensure secure authentication, 
confidentiality, and integrity SSL was enforced [73]. 
When configuring Phishing Frenzy SMTP server to be 127.0.0.1, it uses locally installed 
SendMail. It is possible to configure Phishing Frenzy in a way that it will send out two 
emails in every 10 seconds, whereas other emails are on hold in the SendMail queue. Send-
mail was configured according to the guidelines [74] published in Internet.  
Server Platform  
VMware ESXi was chosen to be the hypervisor platform because this was already in place 
in Tallinn Technological University Institute of Computer Science resources. Installing ap-
plication on top of the virtualized environment gives an advantage of creating snapshots. 
Snapshots give opportunity to revert machine back to desirable state [75]. This guarantees 
that it will always run the same way, regardless of previously conducted assessments. It can 
be especially handy for phishing experiment conductor, who needs to ensure the same ver-
ified state in the phishing platform. In this research after collecting logs and reports from 
the first assessment, the server was reverted to the same state it was before the first assess-
ment.  
Landing Website 
When using Phishing Frenzy, Phishing sites are being hosted in Apache’s web server. After 
creating a new campaign, the field "FQDN" can be found under Email Settings and when 
the campaign is activated it triggers the creation of a new VirtualHost to run the website. 
VirtualHost configuration can be modified at /etc/apache2/sites-enabled/:id.conf. When the 
campaign has been deactivated, VirtualHost will be removed and phishing website will no 
longer be accessible. This means that with the same FQDN it is not possible to simultane-
ously run more than one campaign [60]. 
Buying a Domain 
Domain names are used in Internet for unique identity [76]. Firstly, it should be determined 
if the company would like to spoof an email address or send it out using a valid existing 
email account. Although for spoofing, it is not a pre-requirement to own a domain it miti-
gates the risk of getting detected by spam filters [77]. Buying a domain name is not obliga-
tory, but it is very much recommended in order to conduct successful phishing campaigns 
[77]. 
On the other hand, domain names are not only used for managing emails but also for creating 
valid URL links, which then can be embedded to the phishing emails. Spoofing emails can 
be easily detected. In case of spoofing, there is a mismatch between the link text and the 
displayed link address when hovering the mouse over it. In the same situation if you use a 
legitimate URL then it will not raise suspicions about the origin of the email.  
Concerning this research, DNS was configured to have MX, TXT and A records to point to 
application server public IP. Firstly, “MX record is a type of resource record in the DNS 
that specifies a mail server responsible for accepting email messages on behalf of a recipi-
ent’s domain, and a preference value used to prioritize mail delivery if multiple mail servers 
are available. The set of MX records of a domain name specifies how email should be routed 
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with the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) [77]". Secondary, TXT value can be used 
for Sender Policy Framework (SPF), which is an open standard to prevent falsifying the 
email address of the sender. This technical method validates which mail server is used to 
send mail from the domain [78]. SPF requirements are the following:  
“(1) the domain owner publishes this information in an SPF record in the domain's DNS 
zone, and when someone else's mail server receives a message claiming to come from that 
domain, then (2) the receiving server can check whether the message complies with the 
domain's stated policy. If, for example, the message comes from an unknown server, it can 
be considered a fake.”[78] 
Values used to configure DNS are described in   
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Appendix B - Example of Required DNS values. In addition, three domain names where 
purchased for two phishing campaigns to create senders, manage email logs, and track link 
clicks.  
5.1.5 Creating Phishing Content  
It was discussed in the Chapter 3.1.2 that phishing assessments conducted in an ethical man-
ner must not attack participants or offend them in any way. The key for establishing that is 
developing an email content that is not offensive and does not pose any threat to participants 
well-being. Topics such as “security training”, “somebody has shared a video with you” and 
“an unpaid invoice” were therefore chosen.  
This chapter illustrates how to create a campaign in Phishing Frenzy. The first step is to 
configure email settings; write the subject, from whom the email is being sent and add the 
phishing URL path. As seen on Figure 7. Phishing Frenzy Campaign Email Settings, con-
figuration can be done using GUI (graphical user interface). 
  
Figure 7. Phishing Frenzy Campaign Email Settings 
To design an email, firstly, campaign settings should be opened and, secondly, clicked on 
the option Add attachment. From the drop-down menu four options can be selected: Email; 
Website File, Image attachment, and File Attachment. From previous list it email should be 
chosen and then edit the created .html.erb file with HTML design view. 
In this experiment, HTML design was used to generate an email to invite employees to sign 
up for a GDPR training (Type X email), which corresponds to level 3. The screenshot of the 
Type X email, HTML code and translation from Estonian to English can be found in Ap-
pendix C - Experiment I Campaign I and II Type X Email Content. The configuration of the 
unique trackable link on the example of Type X emails is the following: “<a href="<%= 
@url %>"> http://gdprcompliance.ee/koolitused/ajaplaan-2017</a>.<br />” 
 
The Type X phishing, which corresponds to level 3, should be complex and difficult to 
detect with generally good grammar. These emails seem real and are appealing on curiosity. 
Type X email followed the below characteristics: 
• Sender seems legitimate; 
• Appears as a regular informative email with relevant content;  
• When clicking on the phishing link it redirected to the legitimate website without 
the clicker most likely not noticing it first visited Phishing Frenzy landing page; 
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• If the participant would have clicked on the sender, he or she would have seen that 
it was not spoofed;  
• Generally good grammar; 
• Sender email domain and link domain were the same; 
• In case the participant hovered the mouse over URL, he or she would have seen a 
correct domain name; 
• Exploit of sense of curiosity, obligation, authority and social proof. 
There are some giveaways that show this email is a phishing attack. Firstly, employees 
should have thought if they have visited before such a website, secondly, was this training 
communicated by their managers and lastly, when hovering over the URL link they would 
have seen it ending with http://gdprcompliance.ee/?uid=XXXXXX 
An email informing about successful subscription for a service and an unpaid invoice (Type 
Y1 email) was used only for the first campaign. The screenshot of Type Y1 email, HTML 
code and translation from Estonian to English can be found in Appendix D - Experiment I 
Campaign I Type Y1 Email Content.  
The Type Y1 phishing email, which corresponds to level 2, should be rather basic with some 
spelling mistakes and impersonal greeting. The emails are appealing to feelings of greed, 
fear and curiosity. Type Y1 email followed the below characteristics: 
• Impersonal greeting; 
• When clicking on the link, the landing website redirected to “page not found” web-
site; 
• If the participant would have clicked on the sender, he or she would have seen that 
it was not spoofed;  
• Some grammar mistakes; 
• Sender email domain and link domain were the same; 
• In case the participant hovered the mouse over URL, he or she would have seen a 
correct domain name; 
• Exploit of sense of curiosity, greed, fear, authority, obligation and scarcity; 
The giveaways for this email are that the subject of the email does not correspond to the 
body text. When hovering over the URL the ending seems suspicious 
http://kaunidpildid.eu/?uid=XXXXXX. The participants should also think whether they 
have ever heard of Kaunidpildid, visited their website or ordered anything from this com-
pany.  
An email informing that someone has shared a video with the email recipient (Type Y2 
email), which corresponds to level 2, was created for the second campaign. The screenshot 
of the Type Y2 email, HTML code and translation from Estonian to English can be found in 
Appendix E - Experiment I Campaign II Type Y2 Email Content. 
Type Y2 email followed the same characteristic as Type Y1 phishing email and should be 
recognized as a phishing email as the subject of the email does not match with the body text. 
Although not visible at first sight, when hovering over the URL link, it looks suspicious 
http://salavideo.eu/?uid=XXXXXX-. Likewise, the users should think if they have ever 
heard of such a service provider like Salavideo and whether they have ever visited their 
website or used their services.  
The key distinguisher between the two emails was the level of complexity and the relevance. 
Level 2 email was less relevant as it was offering a service (in one case inviting to watch a 
video and in second case informing about an unpaid invoice), which when landing to the 
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work inbox should seem bizarre. On the other hand, level 3 email informed about an up-
coming GDPR training and asked the employees to sign up for it, which given the relevance 
of the topic among employees, seems more legitimate. 
Landing Website 
To design a website on Phishing Frenzy the first step would be to open campaign settings 
and then to choose the option Edit Email. The next step would be to click on Add Attach-
ment and from drop-down menu choose Website File. Then when clicking on index.php the 
HTML editor will appear. 
Figure 8. illustrates how the website landing page created for Type X emails looks like. The 
full HTML code can be found in Appendix F - Experiment I Type X, Type Y1 Type Y2 Link 
Landing Page HTML Code. 
 
Figure 8. Type X, Type Y1 Type Y2 Landing Website Screenshot 
After clicking on the phishing link, it redirected the user to the legitimate purposefully cho-
sen website. However, the clicker most likely did not notice that the link at first directed to 
Phishing Frenzy landing page. Redirect was configured in Apache GDPR VirtualHost con-
fig file. VirtualHost configuration can be modified at /etc/apache2/sites-enabled/:id.conf 
and the .conf file was created by Phishing Frenzy when campaign was activated. After mod-
ifying VirtalHost file apache service needs to be restarted to apply the new configura-
tion.[79] The giveaway regarding the phishing link should have been that, firstly, the URL 
changed from http://gdprcompliance.ee/?uid=XXXXXX to other domain. Secondly the 
landing website was not related to GDPR albeit the topic of the email was related to GDPR 
training.  
When employees clicked on the link embedded to Type Y1 or Type Y2 email, they saw a 
page not found information as seen in Figure 8, and this time they were not redirected to an 
authentic website. Participants should have, therefore, questioned the legitimacy of the link 
because it does not often happen that the website is not found. The landing pages did not 
purposefully direct to the legitimate landing page because author wanted to measure how 
many employees would report an email with a suspicious link. 
When users visited the phishing campaign landing pages their falling for the phishing was 
registered using a unique trackable link. This link enabled to identify the employee, IP ad-
dress and browser type.  
Sending Out a Test Email 
End-to-end verification must be done before the phishing experiment, to make sure and 
double check that all the components, including DNS configuration, email servers, phishing 
platform and target SMTP spam filter or target computer antivirus protection software are 
fully functioning. It is also important to click on the links embedded in the test email to 
verify that a unique click is registered in the phishing platform. Concerning this research, 
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no attachments were sent together with the email and therefore there were no issues with 
the target’s Antivirus protection software. 
5.2 During Email Phishing Campaigns I and II 
5.2.1 Informing internal and external parties 
On the campaign day relevant stakeholders were informed about the phishing campaign 
being launched. In terms of internal partners, IT helpdesk was informed. In terms of external 
partners, the Estonian national CERT was notified letting them know that simulated email 
phishing experiment is being conducted in the Company X and forwarding them also the 
emails used for testing purposes. In Estonia, although it is not legally regulated to notify 
CERT, it has been a common practise and it is important because if the information regard-
ing the phishing experiment leaks out of the company, e.g. an employee forwards the suspi-
cious email directly to CERT, then CERT is aware that it is part of the company’s internal 
testing and will not initiate an investigation. It is recommended to inform CERT before the 
actual phishing campaign day and then during the campaign day to send a reminder. 
5.2.2 Launching Campaigns 
From the initial 72 targets, after excluding the employees, who were on holidays 53 targets 
were left. Regarding both campaigns, phishing emails were sent out in the morning and the 
campaign was concluded by sending out debriefing emails to all participants at 16:30. After 
sending out the emails, author verified from the email logs that emails were received by 
Company X email server. During the campaign day IT Helpdesk was asked to be alert and 
to reply to any email queries or phone calls coming from the participants and to provide 
them with necessary information, considering the wellbeing of employees.  
5.2.3 Inform Employees After the Campaign 
All participants were sent a debriefing email after the campaigns had concluded due to eth-
ical, psychological and legal considerations. This was done on the same day that the cam-
paign took place. A notification email was sent to all phishing campaign participants without 
any disclosure to their identity or the identity of other participants.   
Following the guidelines described in the Chapter 3.1.6, the debriefing email contained in-
formation about the phishing campaign, including a copy of the phishing email, to disclose 
as much information as possible and to be transparent. Participants were informed that their 
computers were not infected with malware and that their passwords were not collected. The 
email also described how to recognize phishing emails, including a link to the learning web-
site of Company X. In the email, it was once more stressed why reporting of suspicious 
emails is important, how it helps to prevent future attacks and the possible consequences of 
negligence to the company.  
5.3 After Launching Phishing Campaign 
5.3.1 Results  
The aim of this chapter is to answer to the research question: What is a correlation between 
the phishing email difficulty level and the click through rate? Therefore, the below analysis 
seeks to find out are there differences between falling for Type X phishing email comparing 
to Type Y email. Additionally, participants’ ability to detect phishing emails based on their 
gender is scrutinized. The link clicks were counted using UID system provided by Phishing 
Frenzy. Every participant had a random UID tagged to the email address which allowed to 
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track his or her actions. Statistics about how many people reported was gathered by the IT 
Helpdesk.  
In total 53 employees participated in the experiment. Out of all respondents, 20 were men 
and 33 women (see Figure 9). Participants were randomly divided into two groups. Group 
K ended up having 13 women and 12 men and Group L ended up having 20 women and 7 
men.  
 
Figure 9. Participants by Gender 
Figure 10. illustrates that there is a different click through rate (CTR) regarding Type X and 
Type Y emails; 22,6% comparing to that of 11,3%, which elucidates that when the email 
content is more complex (higher-level phishing) people are more likely to click on it. In 
terms of reporting, although the difference is not that striking; simpler emails (Type Y) were 
reported as phishing more frequently (22,6%), whereas more complex emails (Type Y) were 
reported less (18,9%). Therefore, one could conclude that when the phishing email is more 
recognizable, people are also more likely to report it.  
 
Figure 10. Click Through Rate (CTR) and Report Rate 
 
Comparing to the results of earlier phishing campaigns conducted in Company X, level 2 
phishing email click through rate had dropped (11,3% in 2017 comparing to 16% in 2016). 
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Likewise, level 3 phishing email click through rate had decreased (22,6% in 2017 comparing 
to 51% in 2016). Therefore, one could imply that the awareness testing and subsequent 
training in 2016 had an impact on the employee security awareness. 
Iuga and colleagues [23] concluded from their study that in terms of demographic charac-
teristics gender has a statistically significant impact for individuals’ ability to detect a phish-
ing attack. Regarding this study, in total 11 women clicked on the phishing email comparing 
to 9 men, however, given that more women than men participated in the study this can affect 
the results and no conclusions can be drawn. However, if to compare how men and women 
acted within their gender group, some interesting patterns can be detected. Figure 11. illus-
trates that the click trough rate for women is not that much affected by the email difficulty 
level. This is rather opposite for men. Only 5% of all men clicked on the simpler email 
(Type Y), whereas 30% of all men clicked on the more difficult email (Type X). Regarding 
women, 15,2% of all women clicked on the simpler email and 18,2% on the higher-level 
phishing email. Therefore, one could imply that phishing email difficulty level plays less 
role for women. Nevertheless, since the sample size was rather small further research should 
be done to validate the results.  
 
 
Figure 11. Men CTR, Female CTR and Average CTR 
As discussed in 3.1.3. it is also important to gather statistics about how many people 
“caught” the phishing email and reported it. Figure 12 illustrates the current situation in 
Company X regarding reporting. The data captures the results pertaining to 106 emails, 
which were sent out in total, to give an overall picture. Only 18,9% of all phishing emails 
were “caught” and reported (action that the company would expect).  
More than half (64,2%) of all emails were not clicked but also not reported, which illustrates 
that although people detect phishing emails quite well, they do not report these. This implies 
that employees should be educated why reporting is important and how it helps to detect 
future attacks. Almost 2% of all emails were clicked and reported. This behaviour is still a 
positive outcome; albeit there were people who clicked on the phishing emails they realized 
that something was suspicious and ended up taking a positive action and reported the email. 
11,3%
22,6%
15,2%
18,2%
5,0%
30,0%
0,0% 5,0% 10,0% 15,0% 20,0% 25,0% 30,0% 35,0%
Type Y
Type X
Men CTR Women CTR Average CTR
50 
 
Lastly, the highest risk to the company comes from people who click on the email but do 
not report. Regarding this research, 15,1% of phishing emails were clicked and not reported. 
This illustrates that there are still people who need training and help to detect phishing 
emails and that the company is still vulnerable to phishing attacks.  
 
 
Figure 12. Reporting Behaviour of Participants (All Campaigns) 
In terms of participants actions regarding the two different types of email, Figure 13. implies 
that regardless of the difficulty level more than half of people did not click on and report 
neither the Type X (60,4%) nor Type Y (67,9%) emails and there is not much difference in 
this behavior. Likewise, the number of people who clicked on the phishing email and re-
ported it to be suspicious does not differ. Also, the email difficulty level does not signifi-
cantly affect the percentage of people who did not click on the phishing email but reported. 
However, there is distinguishable difference between participants’ action regarding report-
ing the email after clicking on it. Namely, 20,8% of participants who clicked on the more 
difficult email (Type X) did not report it, whereas 9,4% of participants who clicked on the 
simpler email (Type X) did not report it. Therefore, one could imply that after people clicked 
on the more difficult email, they might have not realized it was a phishing email. More 
detailed table consisting of all the results can be found in Appendix G – Experiment I Result 
Analyse Table. 
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Figure 13. Actions Taken with Type X and Type Y Emails 
Comparing to the reporting behaviour during the second wave of the campaigns conducted 
in 2016, the overall situation is rather similar and in average around 20% of people reported 
the suspicious emails.  
The reason for concern regarding these findings is that majority of employees did not report 
suspicious emails and that the results have not improved since the phishing campaigns and 
a training held in 2016. This shows that training effect does not last very long and recurrent 
trainings are needed to refresh their memory. As it was discussed in Chapter 3.1.2, it can be 
also that people react differently to phishing emails based on their personal traits, experi-
ence, behavioural characteristics etc. Therefore, it would be interesting to investigate why 
some employees report phishing emails while others do not and what are the characteristics 
preventing them to take a certain action.  
5.3.2 Interviewing Participants 
As it was discussed in Chapter 3.3.2, interviews allow to probe into participant behaviour 
and investigate how people react to simulated email phishing experiments, which is one of 
the research questions. For more structured interviewing, five people based on their behav-
iour were distinguished for interviewing. Firstly, a participant who clicked on the phishing 
email, which was designed to be more easily recognizable. Secondly, a participant who 
clicked on the phishing email, which was designed to be more difficult to recognize. Thirdly, 
a participant who clicked on both emails. Fourthly, two participants who did not click on 
neither of the emails. Overview of groups can be found in Table 4.  
Analysis of the Interviews  
Three out of five interviewees stated it was their first experience with such a simulated 
campaign and two respondents said they had previously participated in similar campaigns. 
All interviews agreed that the conducted campaigns where ethical and one of the respond-
ents added that employees must be notified about the campaign and its purpose beforehand. 
This was also highlighted by Finn and Jakobson [13] in their study. Another respondent 
added that such campaigns help to better recognize phishing attacks in the future. It was also 
elaborated that the content of the emails should not be offensive in any way, e.g. threatening 
someone’s life, family or friends, asking to send money, saying there has been an accident. 
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This very well resonates with what Finn and Jakobsson [13] were emphasising. One partic-
ipant also mentioned that he or she would not like if the campaign results would be publicly 
shared and everyone would know that this person failed. This illustrates that distress from 
failure can be one of the negative consequences as discussed by many authors [16][36]. 
Employees should be encouraged and asserted that phishing campaigns are for learning pur-
poses only and they are not evaluated based on their failure, which should alleviate stress 
and help them to see the benefits of such campaigns.   
All the interviews were positive towards the simulated phishing campaigns, recognized that 
such campaigns help them to prepare for real life phishing attacks and agreed that the cam-
paigns should be organized regularly. One respondent elaborated that the campaigns should 
take place in every six months to sharpen memory. Two respondents added that learning 
through experience is the best way to learn. Half of the respondents also emphasised that 
the campaigns are beneficial to increase the security awareness within the company. This 
correlates very well with what M.H. Boynton [35] was also saying that when phishing cam-
paigns are conducted in an ethical manner and paired with training phishing campaigns can 
evoke positive emotions and people do not feel that they were deceived.  
Four interviewees out of five discussed that it is relatively easy for them to recognize phish-
ing emails. It was added that main giveaways regarding phishing emails are bad grammar, 
unknown sender, requests to send money, something is needed urgently etc. The interviewee 
who said that it is not easy for him or her to recognize phishing emails elaborated that phish-
ing campaigns have become very sophisticated and more difficult to recognize. Interesting 
here is that the person who clicked on the link also said that for him or her it is easy to 
recognise phishing emails, which contradicts to the behaviour.   
Only one interviewee remembered clearly receiving the briefing email and stated it some-
what helped him or her to recognize the simulated phishing email. Other respondents said 
that either they did not remember receiving the notification email or the notification email 
had no impact. This confirms that people do not necessarily remember receiving the notifi-
cation email and it has limited impact on the campaign results. On the other hand, if partic-
ipants do not recall receiving the email, yet they were all positive towards the assessment, 
it contradicts to what Resnik and Finn [22] argued that if participants are not aware of being 
enrolled to the program it may result in frustration. 
All the respondents said that they recognized the phishing email that was designed to be 
more difficult pertaining to GDPR training (level 3), because it came from outside of the 
company, which is not a regular practise, and this seemed bizarre. Although one interviewee 
recognized it was a suspicious email he or she still clicked on the phishing email out of 
curiosity. In terms of Type Y email, which was designed to be more easily recognizable as 
phishing, the main reason why participants did not click on it was that they had never heard 
of the service provider, it came from an unknown sender, it was not related to work, there 
was a sense of urgency and recognizable grammar mistakes. Once again, a person, who 
clicked on it, said he or she did it out of curiosity. This illustrates that curiosity was the main 
driver to influence participant’s actions. This is an interesting finding because it is not re-
lated to conscious steering of people by hackers in the form of social pressure described by 
C. Hadnagy and M. Fincher [11]. The stimuli for the interviewees was curiosity albeit they 
recognized that the email is suspicious and should have been aware of the possible threat to 
the company. It can also be that the two people who clicked on the phishing email were 
embarrassed to admit that they fall for phishing attack and claimed they did it out of curios-
ity.  
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All the interviewees said that the Type X email was more difficult to recognize as the content 
was less personal and more relevant. Regarding reporting, one interviewee stated that he or 
she reported both emails and two employees stated that they reported only one of the emails. 
The stimuli for reporting was that it was stipulated by internal processes. The main reason 
for not reporting the suspicious email was not finding time to report it or forgetting to do it. 
Four out of five interviewees were aware that suspicious emails should be reported to IT 
Helpdesk and one person admitted that he or she is not quite sure what actions should be 
taken when encountering suspicious emails. In terms of how the email should be forwarded 
to the IT Helpdesk, two people were aware it should be sent as an attachment, however one 
of those two people did not know how to do it in practise. One interviewee said he or she 
would take the PC to the IT Helpdesk and others said they would just forward the email. 
Therefore, although it is quite clear for the interviewees to whom they should report about 
phishing, not all of them are aware of the process or do not feel the urgency to do it.  
In terms of how to improve the simulated phishing campaign process, opinions differed. 
One person thought there should be an informative email sent to employees, another person 
thought it is not necessary (it was sent, but the person who brought it out did not remember 
it). It was also added that it should be included to the brief what is the purpose of the cam-
paign. Three people emphasised that debriefing is crucial and receiving feedback how to act 
when receiving suspicious emails is very important to them. One person elaborated that all 
employees who failed the assessment should be signed to a security training. It was also 
mentioned by two other interviewees that a short training should be organized right after the 
campaigns. Anonymity and data protection were also considered vital for such campaigns. 
In terms of how to improve the simulated phishing campaigns, the main recommendation 
was to send out more personalized emails. Overall, it also seems that level 2 and level 3 
emails were perceived to be too recognizable by some interviewees and they recommended 
to use more complex emails for the assessment.  
The findings imply that people react positively to phishing experiments, if these are done 
properly, and consider it as a learning experience. It confirms that necessary use of deception 
in research, when it is paired with training, conveys limited psychological harm to partici-
pants. On the other hand, they are concerned about their privacy and want the assessments 
to be anonymous.  
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6 Implementation of an Email Spear Phishing Experiment 
As part of this research, author attended Cyber Security Summer School 2017 (Social En-
gineering Capture the Flag Summer School) which was held in Estonia on July 10th to July 
14th, 2017. During the Summer School two spear phishing experiments were conducted in 
company X. The experiments were part of the assignments which were given out to the 
Summer School teams, including the team author was part of. This chapter gives a descrip-
tion of the spear phishing experiments in Company X during the Summer School, describes 
the technical requirements, underlines how data was collected and provides the analysis of 
the results.  
6.1 Introduction to the Cyber Security Summer School 2017 
The focus of the Cyber Security Summer School in 2017 was social engineering. The Sum-
mer School included experts from different fields, e.g. computer science, law, criminology, 
forensics and psychology and consisted of 14 presentations and team assignments supported 
by 9 mentors from different universities. The main purpose of the Summer School was to 
explain how and why social engineering works and give instructions on how to prevent and 
find evidence for social engineering attacks. In addition to increase security awareness and 
knowledge of the participants. [80] 
“Cyber Security Summer School 2017 is organized by Information Technology Foundation 
for Education (Estonia), Tallinn University of Technology (Estonia), Ravensburg-
Weingarten University of Applied Sciences (Germany), the University of Adelaide (Aus-
tralia), the University of Tartu (Estonia). The Summer School is supported by Estonian Min-
istry of Education and Research, Estonian Internet Foundation, and Baltic-American Free-
dom Foundation.” [80] 
6.2 Before Launching Email Spear Phishing Campaign 
6.2.1 Signing a Contract with the Company and Informing Employees 
Before the Summer School, the organizers were looking for companies who were willing to 
cooperate and participate in the experiments as targets. Company X was considered as one 
of the suitable candidates and author was asked to negotiate with Company X to agree on 
terms and conditions for their participation in the experiments during the Summer School.  
Signing a Contract 
As it was described in Chapter 3.1.3, in most of the cases if phishing experiments are con-
ducted contracts must be signed. Likewise, an agreement was signed with Company X prior 
the Summer School outlining the responsibilities and obligations of both parties, including 
the following information. Contract concluded two parts: background information about the 
Summer School assignments and overall terms and conditions.  
Background Information about the Summer School assignments:  
• During the Summer School, participants will search for publicly available infor-
mation about the Company and its employees (Open Source Intelligence); 
• During the Summer School participants are given an assignment to find specific in-
formation about the Company or its employees. Examples of specific information 
include web browser version, display resolution. Specific information that the par-
ticipants will be asked to search for, must be aligned with and confirmed by the 
company.  
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• Participants can use emailing or phone calls to the Company employees to acquire 
necessary information, however, identity theft or threats of any kind are not prohib-
ited. The methods of collecting data must be aligned with and confirmed by the 
Company. 
Overall Terms and Conditions:  
• Dates of Summer School (phishing experiments).  
• Target group size. 
• What type of sensitive information and PII (personally identifiable information) is 
collected. Concerning this experiment, the information that was collected and stored 
was unique trackable link to identify the employee, IP address and browser type. 
• A statement of the ethical conduct of the experiment, namely that the email content 
should not be not offensive and not even otherwise causing strong emotions. Exam-
ples: “We have naked pictures of you”, “Winning the lottery”, “Someone breaking 
into the target’s home”, “Some worrying news about his/her relatives etc.” 
• A statement that the company is responsible for registering incidents regarding the 
phishing experiments and forwarding this information to the appropriate roles within 
the company as set in the company policy. Concerning this research, the responsible 
point of contact for such incidents was the IT Helpdesk.  
• The responsibility of the Company is to send out an informative email on the same 
day after the phishing experiment was conducted. The purpose is, firstly, to inform 
the participants that they were included into the testing sample and if they clicked 
on the email their computers were not affected. Secondly, to give further instructions 
and guidelines on how to recognize phishing emails in the future.  
• An agreement, that after the experiment a report describing the process of phishing 
experiment, the main outcomes and suggestions for improvement will be sent to the 
Company.  
Due to legal, ethical and psychological considerations, notification emails should be sent 
out to employees to inform them about the experiment prior the experiment and this should 
also be stated in the agreement, but as mentioned also in Chapter 5.1.1, the Company had 
already informed employees before the first experiment.  
6.2.2 Informing Internal and External Parties 
The Estonian national CERT was notified prior the phishing experiments during the Sum-
mer School letting them know that simulated email and phone phishing experiments are 
being conducted in the Company X. They were also sent the copies of the emails for their 
awareness.  
The employees were notified about the planned experiments before the first phishing exper-
iment was conducted by author and, therefore, Company X decided that further notification 
emails were not necessary given that the Summer School took place in approximately two 
weeks after the first campaign.  
6.2.3 Choosing Targets 
At the beginning of the summer school one company was drawn from the list of previously 
selected potential target companies and the randomly chosen company was Company X. All 
the experiments were conducted in teams and author was part of the team of six people. The 
spear phishing assignment that was given to the team consisted of a task to design two spear 
phishing emails. The first task was to lead the target to click on a link (provided by the 
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organizing team of the summer school) embedded to the email (Target A). The second task 
was to lead the target to click on a link directing to a simulated website and enable JavaScript 
in case it was disabled (Target B). The following steps were agreed within the team to do 
this assignment:  
1. Collecting background information about Company X.  
o Using Open Source Intelligence Gathering sufficient amount of information 
about the company, potential targets and topics relevant to them with the 
purpose to put together an email that would lead the targets to click on the 
link embedded to the email.  
2. Selecting the two targets for the experiment and spear phishing email content. 
a. Sharing gathered information within the team and selecting the two “easiest” 
targets based on the publicly available gathered information.  
3. Creating the content for the phishing email and sending it to the selected targets.  
a. Creating simulated email accounts, putting together email body and sending 
it out.  
Spear Phishing Target A 
“The success of spear phishing depends upon three things: The apparent source must appear 
to be a known and trusted individual; there is information within the message that supports 
its validity, and the request the individual makes seems to have a logical basis.” [81] 
The first step was to gather information about Company X. To successfully complete the 
task the following sources were used:  
• Company X website 
• Search engines: Google, Duck Go Search  
• Profile engines: Profile engine[63] 
• Social media platforms: LinkedIn, Facebook 
 
Author started gathering information from the company website. A choice was made to se-
lect the target from the PR team for three reasons. Firstly, given that the time was limited to 
execute the experiment, it seemed reasonable to select someone who is likely to be respon-
sive to external enquiries. Secondly, due to the nature of their job, the PR specialists are 
used to communicating with people outside of the office and given that due to ethical con-
siderations we had to create a fake person, it seemed also plausible to choose someone from 
the PR team. Thirdly, this person’s contacts were publicly available.  
That being decided, author started to gather information about the person and Company X 
using Facebook, LinkedIn, Profile engine [63]. It appeared that one local news site cooper-
ates quite frequently with Company X and publishes stories about the company, which 
seemed like a potential connection that would seem valid and relevant to the target.  
The second step was to present the Target A and spear phishing email content to the team. 
The idea was to send out an email to the PR specialist, using reference to the news site to 
whom Company X cooperates and claiming to be a new employee of the news site and 
asking for an additional comment to an already published news story. For that it would be 
necessary to create the fake email account and to think of a realistic email content that would 
also explain why the email was not coming from the news site email domain; e.g. that the 
employee just started and his or her account has not been set up yet, but that he or she would 
need additional information to reply to readers’ comments regarding the specific news story. 
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Into the email there would be embedded a link leading to the “news story” that was the link 
provided by the summer school organizers. The team members agreed to author’s proposal. 
Spear Phishing Target B 
Since the target company was the same, the first step (collecting background information) 
was already completed and the subsequent step was to choose the second target (Target B). 
The criteria for selection was similar; the target had to be responsive and used to getting 
emails from external contacts. In addition to that on the Company X website there was a call 
for action for new partners to contact Company X for potential cooperation. The contact 
form led to the email address of the New Services Manager and therefore the second plau-
sible target that author came up with was the New Services Manager 
The second step was to validate the choice of Target B and create spear phishing email 
content within the team. The idea, proposed by author, was to contact the Services Manager 
(Target B) with an intent to establish cooperation between the simulated company and Com-
pany X. After the discussion within the team it was decided to proceed with this proposal.  
It was decided to send out an email to the target by creating a simulated company and intro-
ducing the sender as a startup owner who is selling smart earrings and is interested in po-
tential cooperation with Company X. To establish trust, one of the team members developed 
a website and registered the domain name and therefore the simulated company name was 
visible in the email address.  
The aim of the task was to get the target to, firstly, click on a spear phishing email link 
embedded to the email, which directed to the website and, secondly, enable JavaScript (in 
case JavaScript was disabled) to see the content of the page. JavaScript allows website cre-
ators to run any code which they like, while user is visiting the website [82]. If the visitors’ 
browser settings do not allow JavaScript the person will not see any content and a pop-up 
message will appear describing that JavaScript must be enabled to see content. 
6.3 Executing Spear Phishing Experiment and informing employees 
After the initial preparations were done, the next step was to create an actual spear phishing 
emails and to send these out to Target A. The team created a fake email account in Gmail 
and devised a name that would not exist in publicly available search engines, including 
Google Search, Facebook, LinkedIn and Profile engine [63]. The email content remained 
the same that was already described in paragraph 6.2.3. Due to privacy concerns the exact 
wording of the email content is not disclosed as it would unveil the Company X and the 
news website. The phishing link provided by the organizers was made invisible by hiding it 
in the hyperlink, which looked like the URL from the news website. The actual link was 
visible only when manually hovering mouse over the link. As it was reported by the summer 
school organizers, Target A clicked on the link and therefore fell for the simulated phishing 
attack 
Regarding the second spear phishing email the content was prepared as described in 6.2.3. 
and then sent out to Target B. The exact wording of the email content is not described as it 
would unveil Company X. As it was reported by the summer school organizers, Target B 
had clicked on the email and JavaScript had been enabled to see the content. After the ex-
periment, Company X informed the employees that they had been included to the spear 
phishing testing as it was agreed in the contract.  
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6.4 After Launching Email Spear Phishing Campaign 
6.4.1 Results 
Both spear phishing attacks were successful, meaning that Target A clicked on the link and 
Target B visited the website and had enabled or enabled manually default JavaScript to see 
the content. In terms of reporting, none of the targets had contacted the IT Helpdesk to report 
suspicious emails or visiting a suspicious website.  
The findings are similar to Cisco’s [83] report results and confirm that spear phishing attacks 
are more successful comparing to mass phishing attacks. There are many reasons that sim-
ulated spear phishing assessments should be more widely conducted among employees. For 
example, the average monetary value from spear phishing attacks is 80 000 USD comparing 
to that of 2000 USD from mass phishing attacks, which means it results in much higher 
financial loss for the company. Given all the publicly available data and that it is not that 
difficult for attackers to design targeted emails, it is likely that the amount of spear phishing 
emails is to increase even more.  
6.4.2 Interviewing Participants 
Both interviewees said that they had been participating in phishing campaigns before. One 
of the interviewees was not positive about the ethical conduct of the experiment. The reason 
being that he or she was allegedly contacted by a journalist with whom he or she is in close 
work relationship. This participant also highlighted that someone should have notified him 
or her about the campaign (this was done but the person did not remember it). This is also 
what Resnik and Finn [22] argued that if participants are not notified this could cause neg-
ative emotions. In contrast, phishing experiment participants did not have that strong feel-
ings towards notification email, which means that when the content is more personal; people 
have also stronger emotions. The second interviewee said that the simulated phishing cam-
paigns are needed to educate employees, but the emails should not be too personal or offen-
sive. This interviewee added that debriefing emails should be sent instantly after the spear 
phishing campaign, in particularly, if the employee falls for simulated phishing attack.  
Both interviewees feel positive about the campaigns and agreed that spear phishing cam-
paigns are needed to mitigate security risks for the company and to educate employees. This 
correlates with what M.H. Boynton [35] and colleagues found in their research that neces-
sary use of deception in research, when it is paired with correct training, conveys limited 
psychological harm to participants.  
One of the interviewees elaborated that the briefing emails should be more structured and 
descriptive giving real-life examples of threats to the company and it should be sent out 
from higher level otherwise it may disappear in the pile of emails. Finn and Jakobsson [13] 
also argued that briefing should be done in a structured way so that the subject learns how 
to avoid falling for real phishing attacks and this helps to build long-term positive relation-
ships. Both interviewees admitted that for them it is not easy to detect spear phishing emails.  
Regarding informative emails, one of the interviewees said he or she remembered receiving 
the briefing, but since it was sent couple of months before the actual campaign, it did not 
have any impact on the results. The other participant said he or she does not recall receiving 
the email after the campaign albeit this would be needed. None of the interviewees instantly 
recognized the phishing email and clicked on it as it seemed relevant and acted both on the 
“principle of obligation” [11], which creates influence through manners by appealing to 
identity. One of them, however, after clicking on the link searched the company from Inter-
net and then realized it was a phoney email.  
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None of the interviewees reported the suspicious email, one because he or she did not rec-
ognize it was phishing and the other because he or she did not think it would matter. Both 
interviewees are aware of the process how suspicious emails should be reported, but one of 
them admitted that sending it as an attachment is too complicated.  
In terms of how to improve the process, one of the interviewees suggested that employees 
should receive instant feedback about falling for the simulated phishing attack and the email 
could be more advanced, e.g. asking to enter credentials. The other interviewee elaborated 
that the simulated phishing emails should be more “shocking” and not too ethical to leave a 
memorable experience for participants. In addition, he or she added that trainings are 
needed, and employees should be walked through the process of reporting suspicious emails.  
Spear phishing emails seem to cause more anxiety and stronger emotions among partici-
pants, which is expected, given that these emails are targeted and touch them personally. On 
the other hand, employees do feel the assessment campaigns are needed to avoid falling for 
real life attacks and given the rise of spear phishing attacks preparing employees is needed. 
Therefore, it should be very well thought through what the possible psychological and eth-
ical consequences of targeted emails are. Likewise, how the privacy and wellbeing of par-
ticipants can be best accomplished so that it would not breach any privacy regulations.  
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7 Discussion and Conclusions 
The aim of this study was to develop consolidated easy-to-implement guidelines for com-
panies on how to conduct phishing experiments and describe in-depth the process, including 
legal, technical and ethical aspects, that organizations should consider. The study sought to 
find out what should companies consider when conducting phishing experiments, what is 
the correlation between the phishing email difficulty level and the click through rate and 
how people react to simulated email phishing experiments.  
7.1 Improvement Proposals 
The main shortcomings regarding Company X that the findings revealed are insufficient 
training and low employee engagement in reporting. The phishing campaigns revealed that 
the company is vulnerable to phishing attacks and therefore further trainings are needed. It 
was brought out by many interviewees themselves that at least after the campaigns short 
trainings should be organized.  
80% of the phishing emails were not reported. Interviewees were not sure how to do it and 
some of them admitted it seemed too complicated for them, which is likely to decrease their 
motivation to report. This problem should be mitigated, and reporting should be made easier 
for users.  
One solution would be to use Outlook Phishing button, which sends the suspicious email 
directly to the appropriate email address as an attachment and deletes the suspicious email 
from the employee’s computer. There are multiple companies who provide such an Outlook 
add-in, for example Lucy [84]. Likewise, PhishReporter offers free Outlook add-in [24] 
available from GitHub. “This simple, yet efficient, Outlook Add-In adds a button to your 
Outlook Home Ribbon that allows users to simply select/highlight a phishing email and it 
will forward it to the appropriate mailbox/email address as an attachment for further analy-
sis. Once the user has verified that they want to send this Phishing email, then the Outlook 
Add-In removes it from their inbox and places it in their “trash” folder[85]”  
Employees seem not to properly understand why reporting is needed and how it helps to 
detect future attacks, which once again highlights the need for a training. Additionally, an 
incentives program could be designed so that employees would get used to reporting suspi-
cious emails. Further management engagement might also improve reporting behaviour and 
get through the message on the security risk coming from phishing attacks.  
7.2 Future Work 
More research should be done to more thoroughly analyse the legal aspects and whether 
GDPR will have any impact on the process of conducting phishing campaigns and how to 
maximise the certainty that the personal data is protected. 
One interesting finding from this study was that employees claimed they clicked on the links 
out of curiosity, albeit recognising it was a phishing email. Therefore, it could be further 
scrutinized, what triggers people to click on the links embedded to suspicious emails even 
though they recognize the content to be fishy.  
It could be also tested whether sending the notification email prior the campaigns affects the 
results or there is no statistical significance. Furthermore, credential harvesting could be 
tested to measure how many participants are willing to give out their credentials.  
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Employee motivation to report phishing emails should be scrutinized and, in particularly, 
what triggers some employees to report suspicious emails and why still so many employees 
are negligent towards reporting.  
Additionally, it should be investigated what impact the phishing experiments and trainings 
have on making employees overtly cautious not to open even legitimate emails, which may 
hamper company productivity. For example, because of phishing campaign and trainings, 
an employee might be too scared to open an email form an unknown sender, which may be 
a legitimate query from a potential customer.  
7.3 Limitations 
This research has limitations that can be addressed in replications of this study. The main 
limitation of this study is that two hours before the first campaign was to conclude, one 
employee forwarded Type Y1 emails to some other employees, which can affect the validity 
of the results, albeit the content was renewed for the second campaign. This study is based 
on one company and the results cannot be generalised. For widespread validity, the study 
must be replicated at other companies.  
7.4 Conclusions 
Making embedded security assessments effective in a corporate environment is difficult. 
Changing employees’ security behaviour is challenging and effective security assessments 
must consider not only ethical and legal principles but also preferred notification method, 
employee reaction to phishing and reporting behaviour. This research confirmed that pro-
posed guidelines are sufficient for conducting phishing experiments in a company setting. 
Summary of the guidelines can be found Appendix A and J.  
The companies must consider that phishing assessment are conducted in a manner that it 
does not pose psychological damage or distress for the participants. The content should not 
be offensive nor attack the participants in any matter and their privacy must be protected. 
Employees should feel good about the campaigns and, therefore, structured briefing and 
debriefing are necessary so that the participants learn how to avoid falling for real phishing 
attacks and feel positive about the campaign. The briefing should come from the manage-
ment to ensure maximum impact and employee awareness. The campaigns should be paired 
with educational trainings.  
The main legal issues that phishing assessments may convey are violations of a provider’s 
terms of use, intellectual property rights and copyright infringement along with data protec-
tion. It is crucial to understand legal aspects prior conducting the campaign not to violate 
any laws; the risks can be mitigated with contractual agreements. 
Prior conducting phishing assessments companies should consider that employees are likely 
to communicate with each other and share information about the suspicious email. This af-
fects the reliability of results when trying to assess the security awareness of employees. To 
mitigate this risk, one of the solutions would be not to send out the phishing email on the 
same day to all employees, but to divide people into groups and send out the email in distinct 
time periods. If it is not possible to test all employees, prioritization should be made based 
on job roles. People whose contacts are publicly available or who process a lot of external 
emails (e.g. employees working within public relation or marketing department) are seeing 
more malicious emails flooding their inboxes and they should be prioritized for internal 
assessments.  
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When choosing the level for simulated phishing campaigns, the company should start with 
the simpler phishing and then based on the employee readiness move further with more 
difficult phishing emails. When starting with a more difficult phishing campaign, it is likely 
that less participants will recognise the phishing email and they may feel unwise and that 
can cause negative emotions about the program; therefore, level 2 or level 3 phishing emails 
would be an appropriate baseline.  
Three main types of technical solutions exist to perform a phishing assessment: open-source 
platform, commercial software, SaaS solutions. Prior choosing the most appropriate solu-
tion, companies should first define their available budget for phishing assessments, in-house 
technical capabilities, time and people resources. They should also consider the internal and 
external data protection policies to determine whether it is allowed to use SaaS for pro-
cessing critical data and based on the set criteria look for the appropriate solution.  
Before launching the phishing campaign relevant stakeholders should be informed about the 
campaign, e.g. national CERT and IT Helpdesk. During the campaign, the wellbeing of 
participants should be considered, and all their queries answered. After the campaign, results 
should be analysed to assess the security awareness of employees and to understand how 
vulnerable the company is to phishing attacks. This gives the baseline for employee educa-
tion and for future assessments.  
The experiment conducted in Company X revealed that the click through rate for more com-
plex (higher-level phishing) emails was 21% and for simpler emails 11% percent. In terms 
of demographic findings, phishing email difficulty level influenced the behaviour of women 
less, as the click trough rate for women was not that much affected by the email difficulty 
level, whereas this was rather opposite for the men. Given the small sample size further 
research should be done to validate the results.  
The findings of interviews imply that people react positively to phishing experiments, if 
these are done properly, and consider it as a learning experience; which confirms that nec-
essary use of deception in research, when it is paired with training, conveys limited psycho-
logical harm to participants. Such phishing campaigns are perceived necessary to detect and 
fight against real phishing attacks.  
Phishing experiments under real life condition provide valuable knowledge to develop coun-
termeasures and prevent individuals from being duped by phishing emails. Although the 
experiments involve deception, they can be conducted ethically if risks are minimized, con-
fidentiality and privacy are protected, potential participants and subjects are appropriately 
briefed before the experiments and debriefed after their participation ends.  
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Appendix A – New Proposed Consolidated Guideline for Email 
Phishing Experiment 
 
Figure 14. New Proposed Consolidated Guideline for Email Phishing experiment 
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Appendix B - Example of Required DNS values  
Table 6. DNS Configuration 
MX records 
Priority MX record value 
10 mail.example.com 
Other records 
Record Type Value 
example.com A x.x.x.x (IP of redirected web 
server) 
mail.example.com A x.x.x.x (IP of mail server) 
mail.example.com txt v=spf1 a mx in-
clude:mail.example.com 
~all 
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Appendix C - Experiment I Campaign I and II Type X Email Content 
 
Figure 15. Type X Email Content  
Translation from Estonian to English:  
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" 
"http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> 
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" style="-webkit-text-size-ad-
just:none;"> 
<head> 
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8"> 
<title></title> 
<body> 
Tere<br /><br /> 
Seoses üleeuroopalise GDPR rakendamisega on kõikidel kriitilise infrastruktuuri 
ettevõtete töötajatel kohustus läbida vastav koolitus.<br /> 
Palun kõigil tutvuda ajaplaaniga: <a href="<%= @url %>">http://gdprcompli-
ance.ee/koolitused/ajaplaan-2017</a>.<br /> 
Esimene infotund toimub juba septembris. 
<br /><br /> 
Lugupidamisega,<br /> 
info@gdprcompliance.ee<br /> 
</body> 
</html> 
 Figure 16. Type X Email HTML Full Code 
Hello, 
In the context of the implementation of pan-European GDPR, all employees of critical 
infrastructure enterprises are required to complete the corresponding training.  
Please get acquainted with timetable: http://gdprcompliance.ee/koolitused/ajaplaan-
2017 
First timeslots will be in July. 
Best regards, 
info@gdprcompliance.ee 
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Appendix D - Experiment I Campaign I Type Y1 Email Content 
 
Figure 17. Type Y1 Email Content 
Translation from Estonian to English:  
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" 
"http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> 
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" style="-webkit-text-size-ad-
just:none;"> 
<head> 
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8"> 
<title></title> 
<body> 
Hea Klient, <br /><br /> 
Palju õnne! Olete registeeritud oma kasutaja. Registeerumise kulusid tasuda enne 
04.07.2017.<br /> 
Tellimus näete aadress <a href="<%= @url %>">kaunidpildid.eu</a><br /> 
Kui saite selle kirja kogemata, siis palun külastage leht <a href="<%= @url 
%>">kaunidpildid.eu</a> ja tühistage tellimus.<br /> 
<br /><br /> 
Lugupidamisega,<br /> 
Kaunidpildid<br /> 
info@kaunidpildid.eu<br /> 
</body> 
</html> 
 Figure 18. Type Y1 Email HTML Full Code 
Dear Client, 
Congratulations! You are registered with your user. Registration fee must be paid be-
fore July 4, 2017 
You will see an order at kaudnidpildid.eu 
If you accidentally received this message, please visit kaudnidpildid.eu and cancel the 
order  
Sincerely,  
Kaunidpildid 
info@kaunidpildid.eu 
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Appendix E - Experiment I Campaign II Type Y2 Email Content 
 
Figure 19. Email of Type Y2 email in experiment I 
Translation from Estonian to English:  
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" 
"http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> 
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" style="-webkit-text-size-ad-
just:none;"> 
<head> 
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8"> 
<title></title> 
<body> 
Hea Klient, <br /><br /> 
Sinuga on jagatud video, mida saad vaadata kuni 06.09.2017 kell 16:00.<br /> 
Video näete aadress <a href="<%= @url %>">salavideo.ee</a><br /> 
Kui saite selle kirja kogemata, siis palun külastage leht <a href="<%= @url 
%>">salavideo.ee</a> ja kustuta video.<br /> 
<br /><br /> 
Lugupidamisega,<br /> 
Salavideo<br /> 
info@salavideo.ee<br /> 
</body> 
</html> 
 Figure 20. Type Y2 email HTML Full Code 
Dear Client, 
Video has been shared with you, you can see it until 06.09.2017 16:00 
Video can be seen on address salavideo.ee 
If you got this letter by accident, then please visit webpage salavideo.ee and delete the 
video.  
Best regards, 
Salavideo  
info@salavideo.ee 
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Appendix F - Experiment I Type X, Type Y1 Type Y2 Link Landing 
Page HTML Code 
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//IETF//DTD HTML 2.0//EN"> 
<html><head> 
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8"> 
<title>404 Not Found</title> 
</head> 
<body> 
<h1>Not Found</h1> 
<p>The requested URL was not found on this server.</p> 
</body></html> 
</html> 
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Appendix G – Experiment I Result Analyse Table 
Table 7. Experiment I Result Analysis Table 
Experiment I (Phishing) 
  
Campaign I (29.06.2017) 
Type X (level 3) Type Y (level 2) 
Group K 
male 
Group K 
female 
Group K 
Group L 
male 
Group L 
female 
Group L 
Emails sent 12 100% 14 100% 26 100% 7 100% 20 100% 27 100% 
Number Clicked 3 25,0% 0 0,0% 3 11,5% 1 14,3% 4 20,0% 5 18,5% 
Number Reported 5 41,7% 2 14,3% 7 26,9% 0 0,0% 5 25,0% 5 18,5% 
Click / No Report  2 16,7% 0 0,0% 2 7,7% 1 14,3% 3 15,0% 4 14,8% 
Click / Report 1 8,3% 0 0,0% 1 3,8% 0 0,0% 1 5,0% 1 3,7% 
No Click / No Re-
port 
5 41,7% 12 85,7% 17 65,4% 6 85,7% 12 60,0% 18 66,7% 
No Click / Report 4 33,3% 2 14,3% 6 23,1% 0 0,0% 4 20,0% 4 14,8% 
  
Campaign II (06.09.2017) 
Type X (level 3) Type Y (level 2) 
Group L 
male 
Group L 
female 
Group L 
Group K 
male 
Group K 
female 
Group K 
Emails sent 7 100% 20 100% 27 100% 12 100% 14 100% 26 100% 
Number Clicked 3 42,9% 6 30,0% 9 33,3% 0 0,0% 1 7,1% 1 3,8% 
Number Reported 0 0,0% 3 15,0% 3 11,1% 5 41,7% 2 14,3% 7 26,9% 
Click / No Report  3 42,9% 6 30,0% 9 33,3% 0 0,0% 1 7,1% 1 3,8% 
Click / Report 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 
No Click / No Re-
port 
4 57,1% 11 55,0% 15 55,6% 7 58,3% 11 78,6% 18 69,2% 
No Click / Report 0 0,0% 3 15,0% 3 11,1% 5 41,7% 2 14,3% 7 26,9% 
  
Campaign I and II 
Type X (level 3) Type Y (level 2) 
Emails sent 53 100% 53 100% 
Number Clicked 12 22,6% 6 11,3% 
Number Reported 10 18,9% 12 22,6% 
Click / No Report  11 20,8% 5 9,4% 
Click / Report 1 1,9% 1 1,9% 
No Click / No Re-
port 
32 60,4% 36 67,9% 
No Click / Report 9 17,0% 11 20,8% 
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Appendix H - Questions Related to Phishing 
General questions:  
2. Have you been targeted by similar phishing campaigns before? If “Yes”, Was this 
campaign any different form the one you have participated in? Please elaborate? Kas 
te olete varem ka kokku puutunud õngituskirjade kampaaniaga, kas siis praeguses 
või eelnevas töökohas? Kas see kampaania oli erinev? Palun põhjendage! 
3. Do you think that conducting phishing campaigns among employees is ethical? 
Could you please elaborate? Kas te tunnete, et õngitsuskampaania läbiviimine on 
eetiline ja millisel juhul ebaeetiline? (Kas töötaja tundeid riivatakse testi tehes, s.t. 
kas ta tunneb ennast katsealusena) 
4. Do you think that it is necessary to conduct phishing campaigns among employees? 
Could you please elaborate? Kas teie arvates on õngitsuskampaania läbiviimine 
ettevõtte töötajate seas vajalik? Miks on vajalik? Põhjendage! 
5. In your opinion, how could the process of phishing campaigns, that are sent to em-
ployees, be improved? Kuidas võiks teie arvates õngitsuskampaania protsessi pare-
maks muuta? 
 
Campaign-related questions:  
6. In general, is it easy for you to recognise a phishing email? Please elaborate. Kui 
lihtne on teie meelest ära tunda sellised kirju? 
7. Do you remember receiving the communication that informed you about the upcom-
ing phishing campaign in advance? If they say “Yes”: Did receiving such an an-
nouncement email helped you to recognize that the email sent to you was a phishing 
email? Kas te mäletate, et saite teavituskirja õngitsuskampaania kohta? (Jah/Ei) Kui 
jah: Kas teavituskirja saamine aitas teil aru saada, et õngitsuskampaania käigus 
tulnud kiri oli test? (Jah/Ei)?  
8. Did you recognize that the email sent to you in June was a phishing email? What 
made you to have that conclusion? If they say “Yes”, but still clicked on the email: 
What made you to click on the email even though you recognised it was a phishing 
email? Kas te saite juunis saadetud kirja puhul aru, et tegemist on õngitsuskirjaga? 
Jah/Ei. Mis teid sellele järeldusele viis? (Kui sai aru, et on õngitsuskiri, aga ikkagi 
klikkis, siis peaks küsima juurde: Miks te ikkagi kirjal klikkasite, kuigi saite aru, et 
on õngitsuskiri?) 
9. Did you recognize that the email sent to you in September was a phishing email? 
What made you to have that conclusion? If they say “Yes”, but still clicked on the 
email: What made you to click on the email even though you recognised it was a 
phishing email? Kas te saite septembris saadetud kirja puhul aru, et tegemist on 
õngitsuskirjaga? Jah/Ei. Mis teid sellele järeldusele viis? (Kui sai aru, et on 
õngitsuskiri, aga ikkagi klikkis, siis peaks küsima juurde: Miks te ikkagi kirjal 
klikkisite, kuigi saite aru, et on õngitsuskiri?) 
10. How would you compare the two phishing campaigns? In your opinion where there 
any differences? Kuidas te võrdleksite kahte väljasaadetud kirja? Kas teie arvates 
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oli neis suuri erinevusi? (kas oli ära tuntav, et üks on kerge ja teine raske) Mis need 
olid? 
11. Did you report the phishing email? Why did you take that decision? Kas te rapor-
teerisite õngitsuskirjast? Miks te nii tegite? Kuidas te reageerisite ja miks? 
12. Are you aware whom you should contact when you see a phishing email? Kas te 
olete teadlik mis käitumist teilt oodatakse. 
13. How should you forward such an email? Kuidas tuleks kahtlane kiri edastada? 
14. Do you think that participating in such experiments helps you to better recognize 
similar phishing emails in the future? Kas te arvate, et eksperimendis osalemine 
aitab teil tulevikus taolisi kirju ära tunda? Miks? 
15. What could be better done in a phishing email experiment? Mida saaks paremini 
teha õngituskirjade testis? 
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Appendix I - Questions Related to Spear Phishing 
General questions:  
1. Have you been targeted by similar spear phishing campaigns before? If “Yes”, Was 
this campaign any different form the one you have participated in? Please elaborate? 
Kas te olete varem ka kokku puutunud suunitletud õngituskirjade kampaaniaga, kas 
siis praeguses või eelnevas töökohas? Kas see kampaania oli erinev? Palun 
põhjendage! 
2. Do you think that conducting spear phishing campaigns among employees is ethical? 
Could you please elaborate? Kas te tunnete, et suunitletud õngitsuskampaania läbiv-
iimine on eetiline ja millisel juhul ebaeetiline? (Kas töötaja tundeid riivatakse testi 
tehes, s.t. kas ta tunneb ennast katsealusena) 
3. Do you think that it is necessary to conduct spear phishing campaigns among em-
ployees? Could you please elaborate? Kas teie arvates on suunitletud õngitsuskam-
paania läbiviimine ettevõtte töötajate seas vajalik? Miks on vajalik? Põhjendage! 
4. In your opinion, how could the process of spear phishing campaigns, that are sent to 
employees, be improved? Kuidas võiks teie arvates suunitletud õngitsuskampaania 
protsessi paremaks muuta? 
 
Experiment-related questions:  
1. In general, is it easy for you to recognise a spear phishing email? Please elaborate. 
Kui lihtne on teie meelest ära tunda sellised suunitletud kirju? 
2. Do you remember receiving the communication that informed you about the upcom-
ing spear phishing campaign in advance? If they say “Yes”: Did receiving such an 
announcement email helped you to recognize that the email sent to you was a phish-
ing email? Kas te mäletate, et saite teavituskirja suunitletud õngitsuskampaania 
kohta? (Jah/Ei) Kui jah: Kas teavituskirja saamine aitas teil aru saada, et õngitsus-
kampaania käigus tulnud kiri oli test? (Jah/Ei)?  
3. Did you recognize that the email sent to you in July was a spear phishing email? 
What made you to have that conclusion? If they say “Yes”, but still clicked on the 
email: What made you to click on the email even though you recognised it was a 
phishing email? Kas te saite juunis saadetud kirja puhul aru, et tegemist on suunitle-
tud õngitsuskirjaga? Jah/Ei. Mis teid sellele järeldusele viis? (Kui sai aru, et on 
õngitsuskiri, aga ikkagi klikkis, siis peaks küsima juurde: Miks te ikkagi kirjal 
klikkasite, kuigi saite aru, et on õngitsuskiri?) 
4. Did you report the spear phishing email? Why did you take that decision? Kas te 
raporteerisite suunitletud õngitsuskirjast? Miks te nii tegite? Kuidas te reageerisite 
ja miks? 
5. Are you aware who you should contact when you see a phishing email? Kas te olete 
teadlik mis käitumist teilt oodatakse. 
6. How should you forward such an email? Kuidas tuleks kahtlane kiri edastada? 
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7. Do you think that participating in such experiments helps you to better recognize 
similar spear phishing emails in the future? Kas te arvate, et eksperimendis 
osalemine aitab teil tulevikus taolisi kirju ära tunda? Miks? 
8. What could be better done in a spear phishing email experiment? Mida saaks pare-
mini teha suunitletud õngituskirjade testis? 
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Appendix J – One-Pager Checklist  
Before launching the email phishing campaign 
1. Define the purpose and desired outcome of the phishing campaign. This affects the 
way the program is structured. Insource or outsource the capabilities.   
2. Sign a contract. It must be signed by a legal representative of the company. Consider 
ethical and legal aspects, e.g. processing of data. The contract should outline the 
following:  
a. Statement of confidentiality and roles and responsibilities 
3. Choose the phishing email difficulty level and participants 
a. Analyse previously conducted phishing campaigns 
b. Select participants and define the target group size 
4. Choose the platform for campaigns, by deciding the following:  
a. Features needed 
b. Free or commercial 
c. On premises or in cloud 
5. Inform employees. Consider ethical and legal aspects so that employees would not 
feel deceived. The briefing email should include:  
a. Description of phishing and possible consequences 
b. Campaign description and purpose 
c. Interactive learning options 
d. Responsibility of the employees and the reporting process 
6. Create phishing content. Consider the chosen phishing email difficulty level. Under-
stand ethical and legal aspects of phishing content, e.g. violations of a provider’s 
terms of use, intellectual property rights and copyright infringement.  
a. Design the email content according to the chosen difficulty level 
b. Choose the attack type and the landing page type 
7. Test the technical setup 
a. End-to-end verification of successful simulated email phishing testing 
b. In case of attachments test by executing these on a target’s computer 
During the email phishing campaign 
1. Notify both internal and external parties 
a. Inform internal IT Helpdesk 
b. Inform external CERT 
2. Distribute phishing emails 
a. Answer participants' queries timely and mind their wellbeing 
b. Verify logs 
3. Inform participants after the campaign. The debriefing email should include:  
a. Attached copy of the phishing email and further details about the campaign 
b. Interactive learning options 
c. Responsibility of the employees and the reporting process  
d. Possible consequences 
After launching the email phishing campaign 
1. Analyse results 
a. Generate report to evaluate company vulnerability to phishing attacks 
b. After the analyses, delete campaign data and encrypt the report 
2. Interview participants to ask feedback for improving the process. Different partici-
pants should be interviewed based on their actions regarding clicking and reporting.  
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